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INTRODUCTION
In Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., the U.S. Supreme Court dramatically limited the extraterritorial reach of
federal securities law, finding that the antifraud provisions of
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule
10b-5 do not extend to securities transactions outside the Unit1
ed States. The decision rejects over four decades of case law
2
embracing the Second Circuit’s “conduct and effects” tests. Instead the Court adopts a geographic test it perceives to be a
bright-line rule, applying Section 10(b) only to securities trans3
actions inside the United States.
In Morrison, Australian plaintiffs, who purchased shares of
National Australia Bank (NAB) on an Australian stock exchange, claimed that Australian bank officials had misled them
4
about the performance of a U.S. mortgage subsidiary. The
plaintiffs sued NAB and other defendants in New York under
Section 10(b), claiming that the involvement of the U.S. subsidiary in the alleged fraud was sufficient justification to apply
Section 10(b) extraterritorially to transactions in the parent
5
company’s stock on the Australian stock exchange. The Second
6
Circuit rejected this claim under its conduct and effects tests,
1. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2881–83 (2010);
see 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2006 & Supp. IV 2011); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012).
2. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2879 (citing SEC v. Berger, 322 F.3d 187, 192–
93 (2d Cir. 2003)). Under the Second Circuit’s “conduct and effects” tests, the
extraterritorial application of the antifraud provisions in Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act required that the alleged wrongful conduct
had substantial effects in the United States (the “effects test”) or that sufficient conduct occurred in the United States even though the effect was only on
investors elsewhere (the “conduct test”). Berger, 322 F.3d at 192–93.
3. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2883–86.
4. Id. at 2873.
5. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 169 (2d Cir. 2008),
aff’d, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
6. Id. at 176.
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but the Australian shareholders appealed. The Supreme Court
again rejected their claim, but the Court also rejected the con7
duct and effects tests. The Court held that securities-fraud
suits cannot be brought under U.S. law against foreign defendants by foreign plaintiffs who bought securities outside the
United States because “the focus of the Exchange Act is not upon the place where the deception originated, but upon purchas8
es and sales of securities in the United States.” Thus, the
Court rejected the views of the U.S. Solicitor General and the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) that the Act
should apply to fraud in an extraterritorial securities transaction that “involves significant conduct in the United States that
9
is material to the fraud’s success.” The Court stated that Section 10(b) reaches only fraud in connection with the “purchase
or sale of a security listed on an American stock exchange, and
the purchase or sale of any other security in the United
10
States.”
The logic of the holding in Morrison strongly suggests that
the SEC would no longer have enforcement rights with respect
to securities transactions taking place outside the United
States. Congress, however, intervened one month later with
Section 929P of the Dodd-Frank Act that purported to reinstate
the conduct and effects tests for lawsuits brought by the SEC or
11
the Department of Justice (DOJ).
For private lawsuits, Morrison’s curtailment of the reach of
U.S. securities laws potentially expands the opportunity for
other jurisdictions to compete with U.S. securities law by
providing their own combination of legal rules, private rights of
12
action, and government enforcement mechanisms. Whereas
7. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2885–86.
8. Id. at 2884.
9. Id. at 2886 (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 16, Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (No. 08-1191)).
10. Id. at 2888.
11. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 929P(b), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). There is some debate about whether this provision actually changed the scope of Section 10(b), which would be required to
legislatively overrule Morrison. Richard W. Painter, The Dodd-Frank Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Provision: Was It Effective, Needed or Sufficient?, 1
HARV. BUS. L. REV. 195, 205 (2011) [hereinafter Painter, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction].
12. See generally Tiana Leia Russell, Exporting Class Actions to the European Union, 28 B.U. INT’L L.J. 141, 173 (2010) (discussing some of the effects
of class actions in the United States that could have precipitated increased
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before Morrison there was always the possibility that U.S. law
might also apply to some transactions outside the United
States, after Morrison transacting parties can be confident that
U.S. law will not apply in private suits provided their transactions are definitively outside the United States. In an attempt
to restrict the reach of the Morrison decision and to test its lim13
its, however, plaintiffs’ attorneys have brought other cases.
Most of these cases focus on determining the geographic location of a transaction—a critical factor in the Morrison decision
that was not fully explained because the location of the Aus14
tralian transactions was relatively easy to determine.
The Morrison decision has important implications for jurisdictional competition in securities law. Because of indicia
that jurisdictional competition post-Morrison could evolve in
two different ways, this Article distinguishes between “Choice
15
of Law Competition” and “Forum Competition.” Jurisdictions
competition from other countries); Merritt B. Fox, Fraud-on-the-Market Class
Actions Against Foreign Issuers (Colum. L. & Econ. Working Paper No. 400,
2011),
available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
1831453.
13. See, e.g., In re Infineon Techs. AG Sec. Litig., No. C04 -04156 JW, 2011
WL 7121006 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2011); In re Royal Bank of Scotland Grp. PLC
Sec. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 327 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Elliott Assocs. v. Porsche Auto. Holding SE, 759 F. Supp. 2d 469 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Absolute Activist Value
Master Fund Ltd. v. Homm, No. 09-CV-08862 (GBD), 2010 WL 5415885
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2010); Plumbers’ Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund v. Swiss
Reinsurance Co., 753 F. Supp. 2d 166 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); In re Société Générale
Sec. Litig., No. 08-Civ.-2495, 2010 WL 3910286, (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2010); In
re Alstom SA Sec. Litig., 741 F. Supp. 2d 469 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Quail Cruises
Ship Mgmt. Ltd. v. Agencia de Viagens CVC Tur Limitada, 732 F. Supp. 2d
1345 (S.D. Fla. 2010); Sgalambo v. McKenzie, 739 F. Supp. 2d 453 (S.D.N.Y.
2010); In re Banco Santander Sec.-Optimal Litig., 732 F. Supp. 2d 1305 (S.D.
Fla. 2010); Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Grp., 729 F. Supp. 2d 620 (S.D.N.Y.
2010).
14. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2876.
15. The parameters of jurisdictional competition in U.S. and European
substantive corporate law have been analyzed extensively by commentators.
See, e.g., ERIN A. O’HARA & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE LAW MARKET (2009);
Christian Kirchner, Richard W. Painter & Wulf A. Kaal, Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law After Inspire Art: Unbundling Delaware’s Product
for Europe, 2 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 159 (2005) (discussing European
law and to some extent securities law); Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E.
Ribstein, Delaware for Small Fry: Jurisdictional Competition for Limited Liability Companies, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 91 (2011); Larry E. Ribstein & Erin Ann
O’Hara, Corporations and the Market for Law, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 661 (2008);
Roberta Romano, The Need for Competition in International Securities Regulation, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 387 (2001); Roberta Romano, Empowering
Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359
(1998). The characteristics of competition among jurisdictions hoping to estab-
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competing to design securities laws that appeal to transacting
parties ex ante (before a dispute emerges) engage in “Choice of
16
Law Competition.” Jurisdictions that are successful in Choice
of Law Competition often bring securities transactions within
their borders because locating a transaction within a jurisdiction is one of the easiest ways to choose its law. Jurisdictions
engaged in Choice of Law Competition usually offer a litigation
forum as well as substantive law. Transacting parties sometimes choose both the substantive law and the same jurisdiction’s forum, but sometimes they choose a jurisdiction’s substantive law with a different forum by agreeing to arbitrate or
to litigate in another jurisdiction.
Jurisdictions that take steps only to expand the jurisdiction of their courts as venues for litigation engage in “Forum
Competition.” Forum Competition usually involves a jurisdiction’s courts applying the jurisdiction’s own law, but sometimes
courts will apply the law of another jurisdiction. A jurisdiction
can engage in Forum Competition by inducing parties to agree
ex ante to use its courts as a litigation forum, but most Forum
Competition turns on a jurisdiction’s attractiveness to lawyers
ex post. These jurisdictions ignore the preferences of transacting parties ex ante and appeal only to the preferences of some
transacting parties and their lawyers after a dispute has aris17
en. Before Morrison, the United States was to some extent
lish a forum within their borders for litigation that appeals to lawyers, i.e.,
“Forum Competition,” has not been addressed in as much of the commentary,
particularly in the transatlantic context. Competition for substantive legal
rules plays only a secondary role in Forum Competition, because substantive
legal rules may have a diminished level of relevance if national courts do not
have an opportunity to enforce their substantive legal rules and transacting
parties cannot rely upon other courts to enforce those rules.
16. Choice of Law Competition is a subcategory of jurisdictional competition. The emphasis in Choice of Law Competition is on substantive legal rules
to attract contracting parties. Adjudication of disputes may be of secondary
importance in Choice of Law Competition.
17. On the supply side, the latter form of Forum Competition does not involve states offering a bundled product of corporate law and adjudication. A
country that makes it more difficult to draw transacting parties to its courts
for litigation is less likely to attract plaintiffs’ attorneys wishing to file lawsuits in that country. A number of factors on the supply side could make it less
likely for courts in some competing countries to attract lawsuits: (1) language
barriers (particularly for countries whose courts do not do business in English), (2) lack of ability to overcome differences between common law and civil
law approaches to adjudication (some civil law countries, like Germany, may
struggle with this problem particularly), (3) lack of ability to overcome procedural differences between courts of different countries, (4) lack of judicial expertise of judges in the required areas of law (not all countries have judges
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engaged in this type of Forum Competition when U.S. courts
provided a forum for “foreign cubed” cases in which foreign
plaintiffs sued foreign defendants over securities transactions
taking place outside the United States (none of the Australian
parties to the Morrison case had expressed a preference for
U.S. law at the time of their securities transactions in Austral18
ia).
As a result of the Morrison decision, limiting application of
U.S. securities laws to transactions inside the United States,
plaintiffs’ attorneys may increasingly look to European countries and other venues to file securities class actions and similar suits. Even lawsuits involving securities transactions inside
the United States face steep hurdles as the Supreme Court has
curtailed plaintiffs’ securities litigation in several other deci19
sions. There is some doubt about the continued viability of

with substantial training), (5) the cost to a country of building specialized judicial expertise in the required areas of the law, (6) incomplete information
about real or perceived judicial bias in the respective country, and (7) uncertainty about mutual recognition of judgments internationally and within the
European Union.
On the demand side of Forum Competition, plaintiffs’ attorneys seek out
the jurisdiction that offers the highest chance of procedural success in any given lawsuit. Procedural success here can mean a high likelihood that a court in
the respective country will find subject matter jurisdiction and will enable the
attorneys to overcome a motion to dismiss. While the substantive legal rules in
the respective country would have to offer adequate and comparable legal protections for the plaintiffs, the likelihood of succeeding on the merits under the
substantive legal rules in that respective jurisdiction, i.e., substantive success,
may be secondary. Plaintiffs’ attorneys may be willing to forego some substantive claims if the respective jurisdiction offers a lot of procedural leeway by, for
instance, allowing suits to proceed with parties who are not citizens or residents of the respective country and have otherwise rather tenuous connections
to the jurisdiction.
18. The evaluations in this article pertaining to competitive structures
between fora are based on limited data. The authors evaluate trends in a limited number of European countries and recognize that the number of securities litigation cases in Europe is substantially lower than the number of cases
in the United States.
19. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148,
152 (2008) (holding that fraud claims cannot be brought against a third party
who did not directly mislead investors but was a business partner with those
who mislead investors); Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S.
308, 310 (2007) (stating that courts must take into account “plausible opposing
inference” when examining whether a plaintiff adequately plead strong inference of scienter). With respect to curtailment of class actions generally, see
also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2561 (2011) (curbing
class certification); AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1756
(2011) (upholding standard form consumer contracts that mandated arbitra-
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20

class actions in the United States in general. Given these developments, European countries may have enhanced opportunities to capitalize on the increasing demand for a jurisdiction
outside of the United States in which to litigate. European jurisdictions may also have an opportunity to engage in Forum
Competition with the United States by providing and improving upon features of the U.S. legal system that lawyers find attractive. The European Union is also a particularly attractive
place for Forum Competition with the United States if a judgment obtained against a defendant in one member state can be
enforced anywhere in the European Union, a region with an
21
aggregate economy about the same size as the U.S. economy.
Thus, even those securities fraud lawsuits that could be
filed in the United States after Morrison might still be filed in a
European jurisdiction that has substantive law and procedures
that are superior to U.S. substantive law and procedures for
plaintiffs and their lawyers. Unlike U.S. class actions, these
suits could include plaintiffs whose securities transactions took
place outside the United States as well as plaintiffs whose securities transactions took place inside the United States.
There is some evidence that, post-Morrison, other jurisdictions—most notably the Netherlands—have started to expand
the jurisdiction of their courts to cover securities transactions
22
taking place elsewhere. These jurisdictions may be setting up
forums within their borders that appeal to lawyers, and after
Morrison may replace the United States as the leader in extraterritorial securities litigation Forum Competition.
The Netherlands appears to be replicating some of the
most attractive attributes of the U.S. securities-litigation system. An important distinguishing feature that so far has made
U.S. courts very appealing to international litigants—at least
tion despite state law determination that they were unconscionable adhesion
contracts).
20. John C. Coffee Jr., The Death of Stockholder Litigation?, NAT’L L.J.,
Feb. 13, 2012, at 14, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ
.jsp?id=1202541959250&The_death_of_stockholder_litigation&slreturn=1.
21. See The U.S. and Europe: Governments of Equal Size?, ECON. POLICIES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (Feb. 8, 2012), http://www.economics21.org/
commentary/us-and-europe-governments-equal-size.
22. See Class Actions: A Global Update, ALLEN & OVERY (Jan. 18, 2011),
http://www.allenovery.com/publications/en-gb/Pages/Class-Actions--A-Global
-Update.aspx; Kevin LaCroix, Dutch Court Holds Collective Securities Settlement to Be Binding, D & O DIARY (Jan. 19, 2012, 3:32 AM),
www.dandodiary.com/2012/01/articles/securities-litigation/dutch-court-holds
-collective-securities-settlement-to-be-binding/.
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plaintiffs—is the availability of class actions and the “fraud-onthe-market theory” that allows plaintiffs to allege that they
were defrauded because they bought or sold a security at a
23
market price that was affected by the alleged fraud. While an
increasing number of jurisdictions may recognize class actions
24
in limited circumstances, only a few countries, such as the
United States, Canada, South Korea, and the Netherlands, rec25
ognize some variation of the fraud-on-the-market theory. Un23. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241–42 (1988). Under the fraudon-the-market theory, a plaintiff is presumed to have relied on a defendant’s
material misrepresentation if the misrepresentation pertained to a security
that was traded in an efficient market and the price of the security was affected. Id.
24. See infra Part III (discussing Choice of Law Competition, as jurisdictions compete to design laws and procedures that induce parties to locate
transactions in their jurisdictions).
25. See Province of Ontario Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5, 138.3
(Can.); [Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act], Act No. 8635,
Aug. 3, 2007 (S. Kor.), available at http://www.fsc.go.kr/eng/lr/list03.jsp?
menu=0203&bbsid=BBS0087; HR 27 november 2009, JOR 2010, 43 m.nt. K.
Frielink (VEB e.a./World Online e.a.) (Neth.), available at http://zoeken
.rechtspraak.nl/detailpage.aspx?ljn=BH2162; Stephen J. Choi, The Evidence
on Securities Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1465, 1508 (2004) (“Korea has
often looked to the U.S. securities regime as a model for how to regulate the
Korean securities markets.”); Dae Hwan Chung, Introduction to South Korea’s
New Securities-Related Class Action, 30 J. CORP. L. 165 (2004); Erik S.
Knutsen, Closing the Gate on Ontario Securities Class Actions, 2006 QUEEN’S
BUS. L. SYMP. 157, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1164262 (“[P]roof of reliance is unnecessary under s. 138.3(4). The
representative class plaintiff only has to prove the misrepresentation elements
enumerated in the statute: that the person who bought or sold the security
suffered damage because of the issuer’s failure to report a material change.
Reliance upon the actual incorrect information is not a relevant consideration
for success.”); A. C. Pritchard & Janis P. Sarra, Securities Class Actions Move
North: A Doctrinal and Empirical Analysis of Securities Class Actions in Canada, 47 ALBERTA L. REV. 881, 892 (2010) (“As with the primary market provisions, there is a deemed reliance provision under the new secondary market
provisions in Canada. Under this provision, the plaintiff does not need to
demonstrate reliance on the misrepresentation or on the issuer’s failure to disclose as required.”); Chung Dong-yoon, Open Season for Securities-Related
Class Actions, KOREA HERALD (Apr. 5, 2010), http://www.koreaherald.com/
specialreport/Detail.jsp?newsMLId=20070109000043 (“The Korean Securities
Exchange Act has the same burden of proof rule in the exchange market as in
the new issuance market and as a result, a plaintiff need not prove the scienter, reliance, transaction and loss causation, which really is a vexing problem.”); Kim Rahn, First Class-Action Suit in Offing, KOREA TIMES (June 25,
2009),
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2009/06/113_47475
.html. Similarly, after a class action regime was introduced in Italy, the Italian Supreme Court adopted something comparable to the U.S. fraud-on-themarket theory, introducing a presumption of reliance and, thus, allowing investors to bring a claim based on a misleading statement in a prospectus or
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like courts in other European countries, the Dutch Supreme
Court in its World Online decision established a presumption of
26
reliance/causation for cases involving prospectus liability. The
World Online decision uses a variant of the fraud-on-the27
market theory, at least in the context of prospectus liability.
Dutch courts could extend the theories used in the World
Online holding to other areas of Dutch law, such as liability for
misrepresentation in periodic disclosure and other types of securities fraud. The Netherlands also allows plaintiffs’ lawyers
to use an opt-out class, e.g., class members described in the
complaint are included in the litigation unless they opt out, rather than requiring an opt-in class, the approach favored by
28
most other European countries.
Another Dutch case, Stichting Investor Claims Against
29
Fortis v. Ageas N.V., illustrates the possible appeal of the
Dutch legal system to plaintiffs’ lawyers. The case was originally filed in the Southern District of New York but had been dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the pre30
Morrison conduct and effects tests. The case was subsequently
filed in a court in Utrecht, the Netherlands, where it is pend31
ing. Similarly, in its Converium decision, another case that
had initially been filed in the United States, the Amsterdam
official company announcement without having read the respective document.
ALLEN & OVERY, supra note 22; see also Bas J. de Jong, Liability for Misrepresentation—European Lessons on Causation from the Netherlands, 8 EUR.
COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 352, 364 –65 (2011) (discussing the World Online decision and its implications); Shelley Thompson, The Globalization of Securities
Markets: Effects on Investor Protection, 41 INT'L LAW. 1121, 1139–41 (2007)
(explaining the differences between the Dutch and U.S. systems of securities
litigation and underscoring the attractiveness of the Dutch rules).
26. See HR 27 november 2009, JOR 2010, 43 m.nt. K. Frielink (VEB
e.a./World Online e.a.) (Neth.), available at http://zoeken.rechtspraak.nl/
detailpage.aspx?ljn=BH2162; see also de Jong, supra note 25, at 364 –65 (discussing the World Online decision and its implications); Thompson, supra note
25 (explaining the differences of the Dutch and U.S. systems of securities litigation and underscoring the attractiveness of the Dutch rules).
27. See infra Part II.B.3. (discussing the fraud-on-the-market theory).
28. Thompson, supra note 25, at 1141.
29. Writ of Summons, (Stichting Investor Claims Against Fortis/Ageas
N.V.) (Utrecht July 7, 2011) (Neth.) [hereinafter Fortis Writ], available at
http://investorclaimsagainstfortis.com/Attachment/194_00052559.PDF.
30. Copeland v. Fortis, 685 F. Supp. 2d 498, 502–03 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). The
court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the claims
brought by plaintiffs and reasoned that the alleged fraudulent activity took
place abroad. Plaintiffs did not adequately allege substantial “effects” in the
United States. Id.
31. Fortis Writ, supra note 29.
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Court of Appeal declared an international collective settlement
32
to be binding on the parties. In Converium, the class members
had very limited ties to the Netherlands (none of the defendants and only a few plaintiffs were domiciled in the Netherlands), the alleged wrongdoing took place outside the Nether33
lands, and the claims were not brought under Dutch law.
There is some evidence that even without a single interested
person domiciled in the Netherlands, the Court could have upheld jurisdiction in the Netherlands to declare the settlement
34
binding.
The Fortis, World Online, and Converium cases, among
others, provide a first impression of a possible trajectory for Forum Competition after Morrison. If these cases are representative of future trends, some litigation may move toward the
Netherlands and away from the United States.
U.S. courts could respond to these developments and continue to engage in limited Forum Competition by retaining jurisdiction over some cases and applying foreign securities law
to transactions that take place outside the United States. Hannah L. Buxbaum notes in this context that “it appears both
theoretically and doctrinally possible that U.S. courts in the future might consider applying foreign securities law to fraud
claims, thus opening an avenue for recovery by investors in35
jured in foreign investment transactions.” Another approach
may be for U.S. courts to apply state law to some claims concerning securities transactions outside the United States if
32. Hof ’s-Amsterdam 12 november 2010, JOR 2011, 46 m.nt. J.S.
Kortmann (Converium Foundation VEB/SCOR ZFS) (Neth.), translated in

http://www.blbglaw.com/cases/00172_data/Judgmentof12Novermber2010CourtofAp
peal.pdf; see also Hof ’s-Amsterdam 17 januari 2012, JOR 2012, 51 m.nt. B.J.

de Jong (Converium Foundation VEB/SCOR ZFS) (Neth.) [hereinafter
Converium COA Decision], available at http://www.cohenmilstein.com/media/
pnc/9/media.1139.pdf.
33. Hof ’s-Amsterdam 12 november 2010, JOR 2011, 46 m.nt. J.S.
Kormann (Converium Foundation VEB/SCOR ZFS) (Neth.), translated in
http://www.blbglaw.com/cases/00172_data/Judgmentof12Novermber2010Court
ofAppeal.pdf.
34. See Legal Alert, Converium: Dutch Court Has Jurisdiction to Declare
an International Collective Settlement of Mass Claims Binding, DE BRAUW
BLACKSTONE WESTBROEK (Nov. 15, 2010) [hereinafter Legal Alert
Converium],
http://www.debrauw.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/Legal%
20Alerts/Litigation%20Arbitration/Legal%20Alert%20International%20Litigat
ion%20-%2015%20November%202010.html.
35. Hannah L. Buxbaum, Remedies for Foreign Investors Under U.S. Federal Securities Law, 75 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 161, 175 (2012) (discussing contingency for applying foreign securities laws in U.S. courts).
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fraudulent selling efforts are directed at residents of a state
(courts will probably dismiss most state law claims on forum
non conveniens grounds when a transaction is outside the
United States, but Morrison does not directly rule on the applicability of state securities fraud laws, and some instances of
fraud might be actionable under state law after Morrison). After Morrison, applying foreign law or state law to foreign
transactions may be the only viable way for U.S. courts to engage in Forum Competition in this segment of securities litigation.
Another consequence of Morrison is that transacting parties now have a clear path to avoid private litigation under U.S.
law by locating their transactions outside the United States.
Private parties—presumably, including U.S. investors and issuers—thus can opt in to the law of another jurisdiction. Although the Dodd-Frank Act still contemplates SEC and DOJ en36
forcement actions in some circumstances, the parties can bind
themselves not to sue each other under U.S. law by agreeing to
complete the transaction off shore. In private transactions in
particular, private parties will notice the factors that courts
consider important to determining a transaction’s geographic
location and then manipulate those factors depending upon
whether they want the transaction to be subject to U.S. law.
This Article suggests that problems presented in the context of Choice of Law Competition and Forum Competition
could require different policy responses. Ambiguities in the geographic “transactional” test in Morrison suggest that the
United States should consider a choice of law policy response,
at least for those cases that are unclear as to the geography of a
transaction and the applicable law. The Supreme Court’s
transactional test in Morrison is easy to manipulate, so to some
extent transacting parties already can choose their law by
choosing their geography. We propose redirecting the focal
point of securities regulation in geographically ambiguous
transactions away from tests for determining geographic location of transactions and toward the parties’ choice of law.
The developments in the Netherlands suggest a possible
proliferation of Forum Competition. This suggests that the
Netherlands could attempt to take over a role similar in some
respects to that of U.S. courts prior to the Morrison decision.
36. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 929P(b), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
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Meanwhile, the SEC and DOJ could aggressively use powers
bestowed by the Dodd-Frank Act to pursue fraud in connection
with securities transactions outside the United States. It is
possible that all sides will exercise constraint, but is it also possible that a broad bilateral or multilateral policy response may
be needed to constrain these and other Forum Competition developments. The acceptable outer bounds of Forum Competition
between the United States and Europe could be defined by
treaty or multilateral agreement.
Part I of this Article reviews the costs and benefits of jurisdictional competition in securities regulation in light of other
alternatives such as coordination and harmonization of securities laws in different jurisdictions. We show that experimentation with different securities regulation regimes can be beneficial. Jurisdictional competition in securities law after Morrison
is also likely to be bifurcated with private lawsuits moving on a
different trajectory than government enforcement. Part II explores recent developments in Europe that indicate a proliferation of European collective procedures that will likely attract
plaintiffs and their lawyers. We show that recent case law in
Dutch settlement procedures expands the jurisdiction of Dutch
courts. Although the collective settlement of securities matters
in the Netherlands does not offer plaintiffs all of the attractive
features provided by securities class actions in the United
States, the Netherlands is becoming increasingly attractive as
a jurisdiction for securities litigation. Part III contrasts the expanding jurisdiction of Dutch courts with the limitations imposed by the Morrison decision. Part III also discusses ambiguities that arise when Morrison is applied to private securities
transactions as well as to derivative transactions, such as securities-based swaps, that are not easy to define geographically as
being “inside” or “outside” the United States. We argue that relying on parties’ choice of law pertaining to private transactions, and Choice of Law Competition among jurisdictions offering legal rules to transacting parties, could be more effective
than relying on geography that is both indeterminate and easy
to manipulate. Part IV recognizes that the Netherlands, the
United States, and perhaps other jurisdictions, may ignore
transacting parties’ ex ante choices and instead engage in Forum Competition that extends the reach of a jurisdiction’s securities law extraterritorially in private lawsuits, government enforcement, or both. Part IV discusses ways in which the
acceptable outer bounds of Forum Competition between the
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United States and Europe could be defined by treaty or multilateral agreement.
I. THE FUNDAMENTALS OF JURISDICTIONAL
COMPETITION
Jurisdictional competition is now recognized as an important factor in legal evolution in areas ranging from corpo37
rate law to admiralty law. Jurisdictions design legal regimes
to govern certain relationships—mostly contractual in nature—
and then private parties choose which regime to use. The optimal legal regime for a transaction, series of transactions, or ongoing contractual relationship depends upon a number of factors such as the quality and predictability of legal rules, the
flexibility of legal rules (does the jurisdiction allow parties to
choose their rules?), and the cost and quality of adjudication.
Jurisdictions compete to offer legal rules and adjudication procedures that attract users. Some users of the legal regime may
be more attractive to a jurisdiction than others; many jurisdictions, for example, do not want to bring fraudulent transactions
within their borders. The payoff for the jurisdiction from this
competition is franchise and other taxes, fees for lawyers and
other professionals, private sector opportunities for government
officials and judges, and collateral benefits for other businesses
in the jurisdiction such as banks and broker-dealers.
Perhaps most important for the discussion in this Article,
jurisdictional competition is sometimes allowed to be independ38
ent of the geographic location of parties or transactions. The
legal systems that provide rules and adjudication are usually
(but not always) rooted in geography, but the users of these
systems need not always be in the same geographic location.
This is very different from the traditional geographically-rooted
jurisdictional competition that still prevails in areas such as income taxation and some aspects of employment and environ39
mental regulation. In the traditional geographically-rooted
form of jurisdictional competition, if parties or transactions are
located in the particular jurisdiction, they are stuck with its
rules unless they choose to move. The “seat theory” of corporate
40
law that prevailed in Europe for many years is an example of
this more limited type of jurisdictional competition constrained
37.
38.
39.
40.

See O’HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 15, at 29–31.
Id. at 68.
See Kirchner, Painter & Kaal, supra note 15, at 160–61.
See id.
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by geography, whereas the “incorporation theory” in U.S. corporate law and now to some extent in E.U. corporate law is an
example of the more expansive type of jurisdictional competi41
tion that is less restricted by geography.
The economic benefits of jurisdictional competition are
usually described from the vantage point of rational actors acting with near perfect information. One group of rational actors
designs legal rules and adjudicates disputes over those rules,
and another group of rational actors decides which legal rules
42
shall govern their relationships. Another approach to jurisdictional competition, however, emphasizes the fact that both providers and consumers of legal rules have imperfect information
and benefit from experimentation with different rules. Some
commentators draw on theories of “New Institutional Economics” to suggest that jurisdictional competition can be superior to
harmonization and coordination if jurisdictional competition
gives decision makers more opportunity to learn about the ef43
fects of different legal rules.
In addition to imperfect information, another important
factor is change. Because market conditions to which legal
rules apply constantly evolve, rules need to change as well. Experimentation, observation, and rule revision are part of an ongoing process that may never end with a stable “optimal” rule.
41. Id.
42. See id. at 164 –65.
43. See id. at 182 (discussing the phenomenon of jurisdictional competition in the evolution of European corporate law). See generally EIRIK G.
FURUBOTN & RUDOLF RICHTER, INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC THEORY: THE
CONTRIBUTION OF THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 5 (3d ed. 2003)
(providing an overview of New Institutional Economics); DOUGLASS C. NORTH,
INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 7–8
(1990) (discussing the role of institutional change in historical change and
economics); STEFAN VOIGT, INSTITUTIONENÖKONOMIK [INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS] 22–23 (2d ed. 2009); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 15–17
(1985) (discussing transaction-cost economics and the role of organizations and
institutions in the capitalist system); Ronald Coase, The New Institutional
Economics, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 72, 72–74 (1998) (commenting on the inclusion
of transaction and information costs and the role of social and cultural change
in New Institutional Economics); Christian Kirchner, Public Choice and New
Institutional Economics: A Comparative Analysis in Search of Co-operation
Potentials, in PUBLIC ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC CHOICE 19, 32 (Pio Baake &
Rainald Borck eds., 2007) (comparing the Public Choice approach in political
science to New Institutional Economics); Oliver E. Williamson, TransactionCost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON.
233 passim (1979) (analyzing the role of transaction costs in New Institutional
Economics theories).
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The only constant is that continued experimentation with different rules is more advantageous than forming a consensus
44
around static rules. Learning through experimentation is
probably most effective when jurisdictions experiment with different rules and then discover which ones work and which ones
do not. Transacting parties affected by legal rules do the same.
When underlying economic circumstances change, it is more
likely that a jurisdiction will change its rules if there is jurisdictional competition than if all jurisdictions are bound to agree
upon the same rule before they change it.
Finally, experimentation allows for jurisdictions to work
with non-governmental organizations and other international
institutions to build consensus—albeit a changing consensus—
on the “soft law” that defines generally accepted standards for
45
securities transactions. For example, the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) is an important
standard setter for securities regulation in key areas such as
disclosure regulation in cross border offerings of securities. In
2008, IOSCO issued a Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding setting forth a process that allows national securities
regulators to obtain assistance from their counterparts in other
countries with obtaining evidence, witnesses, and the proceeds
46
of securities fraud. The International Accounting Standards
Board (IASB) is another critically important organization that
has recently turned its attention to valuation of derivative se47
curities and other financial assets in times of financial stress.
Many of the agreements, memoranda of understanding,
and procedures developed by these institutions may not be codified in statutes and regulations of any jurisdiction, but they
will have a substantial impact on how the legal rules in different jurisdictions are actually implemented. Jurisdictions that
experiment with legal rules, and different ways of enforcing
those rules, will be able to integrate their legal rules with both
the legal rules of other jurisdictions and the “soft law” of international institutions. Jurisdictions that seek unilaterally to define a single theoretically “correct” approach to a problem, and
then codify that approach in rules that are difficult to change,
44. See Kirchner, Painter & Kaal, supra note 15, at 182.
45. See generally CHRIS BRUMMER, SOFT LAW AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL
SYSTEM: RULE MAKING IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2012) (discussing the purpose,
operation, and limitations of non-binding international financial rules).
46. Id. at 77–78.
47. Id. at 83.
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will find it more difficult to integrate their rules with a global
48
financial system that could be headed in a different direction.
Despite its many advantages, jurisdictional competition
has some detractors. Some commentators emphasize the “race
to the bottom” phenomenon in which jurisdictions compete for
private patronage of their legal systems by designing rules that
bestow lopsided advantages on private actors able to choose the
49
legal regime and impose that choice on other actors. For example, corporate managers may take advantage of jurisdictional competition to impose a jurisdiction’s pro-management corporate law on investors because those investors, for whatever
50
reason, have no choice. One alternative to jurisdictional competition is harmonization of the law in different jurisdictions
through multilateral agreements or some other form of standardization. Another approach is coordination among jurisdictions that have different legal rules so there are some minimum standards for investor protection, employee protection,
cross border enforcement of judgments or other objectives. Finally, jurisdictional competition in securities law, as in other
areas of law, may be bifurcated between private litigation and
government enforcement, with some jurisdictions seeking aggressively to apply their law extraterritorially to securities
transactions in one of these spheres but not both.
A. THE HARMONIZATION ALTERNATIVE
The most often mentioned alternative to jurisdictional
competition is harmonization of legal rules and adjudication
systems across jurisdictions. The European Union, for example,
48. Arguably the United States has done this in implementing a securities
regulation regime that adheres to rules based on Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) instead of the International Accounting Standards
(IAS) used in many other parts of the world, although U.S. securities regulation has recently moved to accommodate issuers using International Financial
Reporting Standards. See Commission Statement in Support of Convergence
and Global Accounting Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. 9494 (Mar. 2, 2010).
49. See William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon
Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 666–68, 705 (1974); Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T.
Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903, 906, 948–50 (1998); Alvin K. Klevorick,
The Race to the Bottom in a Federal System: Lessons from the World of Trade
Policy, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 177, 178 (1996). But see RALPH K. WINTER,
GOVERNMENT AND THE CORPORATION 7–11 (1978) (arguing that there is instead a “race to the top” as jurisdictions compete to design better corporate
law).
50. O’HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 15, at 122, 129–30.
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attempts to harmonize corporate and securities law as well as
many other areas of the law. Efforts to harmonize the law of
various jurisdictions are undertaken for a range of reasons, including the perceived threat of disparate rules in different jurisdictions. Harmonization can be accomplished through bilateral or multilateral agreements, but it can sometimes be
imposed unilaterally. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was an
attempt to harmonize some aspects of corporate governance
law—for example, by imposing a requirement for independent
directors and audit committees—inside the United States and
even for non-U.S. issuers with publicly traded securities in the
51
United States. The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 imposed additional corporate governance requirements on financial institutions
52
that do business in the United States.
There are several problems with harmonization. First, the
“harmonious” rule may be the wrong rule for solving a particular problem, or the rule could become wrong later based on
changing circumstances. Financial regulation, for example, is a
quickly evolving area of law given the enormous changes in
capital markets in the past several decades and the changes
that are likely to take place in the future. A harmonious legal
regime for financial regulation is likely to be the one that all jurisdictions agree upon, not necessarily the legal regime that is
best for all, or even most, of the jurisdictions where it is implemented. Second, harmonization is difficult to accomplish politically unless there is a central authority that can preempt the
law in a multitude of jurisdictions or, alternatively, a jurisdiction has so much economic clout that it can impose its rules on
others. These political problems make harmonization difficult
to take beyond national borders. Third, harmonization invites
efforts to undermine harmony by “rogue” jurisdictions that seek
to benefit by attracting to their legal systems private actors
who do not agree with the harmonization. Even in organized
communities of jurisdictions—such as the European Union—
collective action problems make it very difficult to avoid “defection” by members of the community or other jurisdictions that
seek to undermine harmonization. In sum, harmonization of legal regimes may not be desirable and, furthermore, may be a
political and practical impossibility.

51. Id. at 30–31.
52. Painter, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, supra note 11, at 199.
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B. THE COORDINATION ALTERNATIVE
Coordination is a “compromise” approach whereby jurisdictions have different legal regimes, and to some extent compete
to design better regimes, but also coordinate their approaches
in one or more areas such as: (1) establishing an agreed upon
ceiling or floor for how much or how little regulation there will
be in a given area, (2) coordinating enforcement regimes so the
consequences of breaking legal rules are similar across jurisdictions, (3) coordinating adjudication regimes so private parties
have relatively similar remedies across jurisdictions, (4) providing for enforcement of judgments from other jurisdictions, (5)
promoting cross-jurisdictional arbitration and enforcement of
arbitration awards, and (6) harmonizing some areas of the law
(for example, disclosure rules) while allowing jurisdictional
competition in other areas (for example, substantive rules gov53
erning fiduciary obligations of business managers).
Most coordination efforts are likely to experience the same
political and other impediments that face harmonization efforts, although to a lesser degree when coordination focuses only on isolated issues and jurisdictions otherwise have autonomy
in determining their own rules. Nonetheless, for policy makers
worried that unrestrained jurisdictional competition can lead to
a “race to the bottom” and impose externalities or unwanted
costs on persons other than the parties to transactions, some
form of coordination may be an attractive alternative. Some
E.U. directives allow individual Member States enough flexibility to be characterized as coordination rather than harmonization, and this approach often emerges when efforts to harmo54
nize laws across the European Union are unsuccessful. For
example, Germany and other Member States rejected the European Union’s attempt in the early 2000s to impose the United
Kingdom’s “strict neutrality rule,” barring directors from implementing defenses to hostile takeovers without shareholder
consent, after harsh criticism by German industry and academic commentators who feared an uneven playing field favoring
55
foreign bidders. As a result, a revised E.U. takeover directive
53. Kirchner, Painter & Kaal, supra note 15, at 161–63.
54. Id.
55. See generally Christian Kirchner & Richard W. Painter, European
Takeover Law: Towards a European Modified Business Judgment Rule for
Takeover Law, 1 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 353 (2000) (criticizing the strict neutrality rule in Article 9(1)(a) of the proposed directive); Richard W. Painter,
Don’t Disadvantage Europe: The European Parliament Made the Right Call in
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allowed Member States to opt out of the strict neutrality rule
56
and permit board initiated takeover defenses.
C. BIFURCATED JURISDICTIONAL COMPETITION IN SECURITIES
LAW
Jurisdictional competition could follow a different trajectory in private litigation than it does in government enforcement
actions. Private suits could be permitted in some jurisdictions
but not in others, and among jurisdictions that allow private
suits, some might be more willing to apply their law extraterritorially than others. Government enforcement could be more
robust in some jurisdictions than in others, and some jurisdictions may be more aggressive than others in extending government enforcement beyond their borders.
Private litigation and government enforcement thus could
respond differently to the same fundamental problem: the difficulty of confining effects of regulation to defined geographic
boundaries. As Chris Brummer points out in his book Soft Law
and the Global Financial System, “[h]ow geographic borders are
defined for regulatory purposes is not always a straightforward
matter” and “[b]y operating as a gateway to investors, consumers, and capital, territoriality can be leveraged in a way that
can affect foreign firms (at a minimum those operating in the
country) and, potentially, the conduct or approach by foreign
57
regulators . . . .” Defined geographic borders for securities
transactions—the overarching assumption behind the Morrison
decision—are an unstable basis for limiting the extraterritorial
reach of both private litigation and government regulation.
Courts adjudicating private lawsuits may deal with the problem one way, for example, by developing a jurisprudence that
defines as best it can when a transaction is within certain
boundaries or, alternatively, by honoring parties’ choice of law.
Government regulators, on the other hand, may focus on other
criteria such as whether the conduct occurs within their borders or the effects of certain conduct within their borders; they
may do so through coordination with other jurisdictions or uniRejecting the Strict Neutrality Rule, WALL ST. J. EUR., July 19, 2001, at 9 (criticizing the proposed E.U. corporate takeover directive rejected by the E.U.
Parliament).
56. See Directive 2004/25/EC, of the European Parliament and of the
Council, 2004 O.J. (L142) art. 12 (setting forth “optional arrangements” allowing Member States not to require companies with registered offices within its
territory to comply with the strict neutrality rule in Article 9).
57. BRUMMER, supra note 45, at 34 –35.
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laterally, provoking possible confrontation with regulators in
other jurisdictions.
Bifurcated jurisdictional competition will characterize
global securities litigation after Morrison because some jurisdictions recognize private rights of action whereas others do
not, and some jurisdictions such as the United States have
sought to extend government enforcement actions extraterritorially in situations where private lawsuits would not be permit58
ted.
The Morrison decision has not affected government enforcement of U.S. securities law as much as civil litigation.
First, Section 929P of the Dodd-Frank Act reinstates for SEC
suits and DOJ criminal prosecutions the conduct and effects
59
tests that prevailed before Morrison. Second, at least one
court has held that “offers” of securities inside the United
States are covered by Section 17(a) of the 1933 Securities Act,
even if there is no transaction giving rise to other securities law
60
claims, such as under Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act. The SEC
or DOJ under this theory can bring an action over the illegal
“offer” even though the actual sale took place somewhere else.
Against this background, other countries may still compete
with the United States to design better legal rules and enforcement regimes to attract securities transactions within
their borders, but they must do so knowing that there still
could be intervention by the SEC or DOJ. The extraterritorial
reach of SEC or DOJ actions can be implicated if there is an
“offer” in the United States or if the U.S. conduct component is
sufficient to allow a suit under Section 929P. A U.S. enforcement overlay, for example, might occur if information is misap-

58. Bifurcated jurisdictional competition could be limited to government
enforcement in countries, such as Germany, that emphasize public law enforcement over private rights of action.
59. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 929P(b), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). There is some debate about whether Section
929P does, in fact, change the substantive reach of the securities laws in SEC
and DOJ cases or whether its express language merely confers jurisdiction on
federal courts to hear these cases. See Richard W. Painter et al., When Courts
and Congress Don’t Say What They Mean: Initial Reactions to Morrison v. National Australia Bank and to the Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Provisions of the
Dodd-Frank Act, 20 MINN. J. INT’L L. 1, 1–5, 14 –25 (2011); Painter, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, supra note 11, at 205–08.
60. See SEC v. Tourre, No. 10-Civ.-3229(BSJ)(MHD), 2011 WL 1458545
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 2011).
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propriated in the United States for insider trading in a non61
U.S. market.
Civil litigation under U.S. securities laws, on the other
hand, has been substantially changed because after Morrison
plaintiffs must now satisfy Justice Scalia’s “transactional test”
and show that they bought or sold in a transaction within the
62
borders of the United States in order to sue. A person trading
contemporaneously with an insider trader on a non-U.S. market would have no cause of action under U.S. law, even if Section 929P gave the SEC and the DOJ the power to pursue the
perpetrator.
This bifurcated jurisdictional competition—with SEC and
DOJ enforcement going in one direction and civil litigation in
another—poses some unique challenges. Even if the parties to a
transaction can choose to remove their transaction from the
United States and, thereby, opt into the law of another jurisdiction, the possibility remains that the SEC or DOJ could follow
them. A party to a disputed transaction outside the United
States can even reintroduce U.S. law into the civil liability regime by threatening to involve the SEC or DOJ if the other party does not offer an attractive settlement. Uncertainty about
the significance of such a threat can cast a long shadow over
the civil liability regime.
Nonetheless, Section 929P does not restore private rights
of action. The Dodd-Frank Act ordered an SEC study on this
63
topic, but the chances are slim that Congress will restore private rights of action under the conduct and effects tests. The
most powerful weapon in plaintiffs’ arsenal, the fraud-on-themarket theory in class actions, is thus thwarted in those instances where transactions are outside the United States. The
fact that an SEC action is still possible may change the settlement value of a foreign lawsuit, but not as much as if there
were also the potential for a private class action under the indeterminate Second Circuit case law that preceded Morrison.
One advantage of bifurcated jurisdictional competition is
that the SEC and DOJ enforcement regimes can be a backstop
61. See Painter, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, supra note 11, at 216–17.
62. Morrison ruled on Section 10b of the 1934 Act but the ruling probably
extends to all private rights of action under the federal securities laws.
63. See Dodd-Frank Act § 929Y; SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STUDY ON THE
CROSS-BORDER SCOPE OF THE PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION UNDER SECTION
10(B) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 (2012), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2012/929y-study-cross-border-private-rights.pdf.
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against a race to the bottom in the civil liability arena. The argument for allowing choice of law freedom for transacting parties is more persuasive when bad choices by contracting parties—such as moving securities transactions offshore to
regimes with little or no regulation—do not thwart enforcement
action by government authorities. Proponents of the race to the
bottom theory will have a less compelling argument against allowing contractual freedom than they would if the parties’
choice of legal regime allowed them to opt out of SEC and DOJ
enforcement as well as civil liability.
In sum, jurisdictional competition in securities regulation
may be mixed with efforts to harmonize the law in different jurisdictions and, where harmonization is not possible or practical, efforts to coordinate the law of different jurisdictions. Private securities litigation may proceed along one trajectory
while government enforcement proceeds along another. In some
instances, jurisdictions will engage in Choice of Law Competition, allowing transacting parties to choose a legal regime for
their transactions, and in other instances jurisdictions will engage in Forum Competition, allowing private plaintiffs access
to their courts. Some jurisdictions may also engage in government-enforcement-oriented Forum Competition in which courts
and other government agencies are used to facilitate enforcement initiatives reaching across geographic boundaries.
II. FORUM COMPETITION AFTER MORRISON
It is possible that other jurisdictions will follow the United
States in accepting the basic premise of Morrison and then design rules and adjudication procedures that apply only to securities transactions within the geographic boundaries of the jurisdiction. Although, as explained above, it would be difficult to
identify the location of some transactions, most transactions
would be subject only to the law of one jurisdiction. Jurisdictions also might use coordination or some other strategy to
agree upon rules for determining the “transaction location” of
private sales of securities, security-based swaps, and other
transactions that do not take place on organized exchanges.
In this type of jurisdictional competition, the focus would
be on Choice of Law Competition as jurisdictions compete to
design laws and procedures that make transacting parties want
to locate transactions in their jurisdictions. Securities exchanges and other intermediaries would presumably play a significant role in designing legal regimes with this end in mind. The
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“race to the top” versus “race to the bottom” debate is central to
assessing the qualitative outcome of this type of jurisdictional
competition.
Forum Competition, however, could evolve quite differently
if one or more countries seek to do what the United States did
before Morrison—and what Section 929P of the Dodd-Frank
Act still allows the United States to do in SEC and DOJ actions—and superimpose their law on securities transactions
outside their geographic borders. If plaintiffs’ lawyers and other interest groups that benefit from securities litigation find a
way to influence the relevant jurisdiction to apply securities
law extraterritorially, such a “race to extraterritoriality” can be
64
expected. Even though the United States in Morrison unilaterally withdrew from this race to extraterritoriality in the civil
litigation arena, this does not mean that other countries will
also stand down.
Several factors may, over time, increase Forum Competition between the United States and Europe. One factor is the
proliferation of “piggyback” suits. Piggyback suits are lawsuits
that plaintiffs bring in one jurisdiction after unsuccessful
suits—or suits in which plaintiffs have only limited success—in
65
another jurisdiction. European piggyback suits can be based
on suits pending in U.S. courts that are dismissed under Morrison as well as upon suits that are allowed to proceed in the
66
United States. These piggyback suits may be encouraged by a
judicial trend allowing the enforcement of U.S. class action set67
tlements in the Netherlands. There is some evidence that
Dutch and other European courts could expand their extraterritorial reach beyond the enforcement of settlements to cover
68
cases being litigated as class actions. American piggyback
suits could be lawsuits brought by the SEC and the DOJ under
Section 929P(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act “for conduct occurring
outside the United States that has a foreseeable substantial ef64. The plaintiffs’ bar in the United States and its supporters in Congress
sought to legislatively preempt the holding in Morrison with legislation drafted before Morrison was decided, but Congress adopted a compromise position
in Section 929Y of the Dodd-Frank Act simply mandating an SEC study of
whether an extraterritorial private right of action should be created. For discussion of the Dodd-Frank provisions, see Painter, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, supra note 11, at 199.
65. See infra Part II.B.2.a–b (describing the Fortis and Converium cases).
66. See infra Part II.B.2.a–b (describing the Fortis and Converium cases).
67. See infra text accompanying notes 182–84 & 204–10.
68. See infra Part II.B.3 (describing the World Online case).
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69

fect in the United States.” In these situations, the SEC or
DOJ would “piggyback” on civil litigation or enforcement efforts
in Europe or elsewhere outside the United States.
An important factor in Forum Competition is the existence
of procedural rules that increase or decrease the size of the
class in a class action or other collective procedure. Plaintiffs’
lawyers often prefer larger classes because they result in larger
settlements; defendants’ lawyers sometimes seek to limit the
size of the plaintiff classes, although they may prefer larger
classes in settlements. Most of the collective procedures for
class actions in Europe allow for an opt-in procedure but prohibit or curtail procedures that require plaintiffs to opt-out of a
70
suit. Without an opt-out mechanism, European class sizes will
likely be substantially smaller than their U.S. counterparts.
71
This could impact settlement amounts and damages awards.
The smaller class size of European collective procedures for securities actions could limit the number and impact of European
suits.
The Netherlands has adopted both opt-in and opt-out
mechanisms. The Dutch Act on the Collective Settlement of
72
Mass Claims (WCAM) allows the parties to a settlement
agreement to request the Amsterdam Court of Appeal to declare the settlement agreement binding on all persons involved
73
in the action. Compared to other European collective procedures, the WCAM comes closest to U.S. class actions in provid74
ing an opt-out mechanism with regard to settlements. By con69. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 929P(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1865 (2010) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
70. See sources cited infra note 224.
71. Another factor is that punitive damages are rarely awarded in Europe.
72. Wet Collectieve Afwikkeling Massaschade [WCAM] [Collective Settlement of Mass Claims], Stb. 2005, p. 340 (Neth.), available at http://www
.eerstekamer.nl/9370000/1/j9vvhwtbnzpbzzc/vh22drdk4jr7/f=y.pdf; Legal Alert
Converium, supra note 34.
73. See infra Part II.B.1.
74. Eberhard Feess & Axel Halfmeier, The German Capital Markets
Model Case Act (KapMuG)—A European Role Model for Increasing the Efficiency of Capital Markets? Analysis and Suggestions for Reform 14 (January
2012), (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1684528 (“Thereby, a two step notification process is adopted where the first
notification refers to class members already known, and the second one to unknown class members by means of public communications. After the settlement is approved, the court determines a period of at least 3 months for persons who want to opt out because they prefer to proceed with individual
claims.”).
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trast, the German Act on Model Procedures for Mass Claims in
75
Capital Markets Cases (KapMuG) does not provide an opt-out
76
77
mechanism. Sweden’s Group Proceedings Act (GPA) also
prohibits an opt-out procedure; each member of a class must
individually opt into the class. In 2008, however, Denmark introduced an opt-out option for group actions involving small in78
dividual claims.
Yet another issue is how the United States and Europe will
address situations where the geographic location of a transaction is ambiguous. These include securities that are listed on
securities exchanges in two or more jurisdictions (dual-listed
79
securities), securities-based swap agreements entered into by
parties in one jurisdiction that reference a security traded in
80
another jurisdiction, and private transactions that are de-

75. Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahrensgesetz [KapMuG] [Capital Market
Investors’ Model Proceeding Act], Aug. 16, 2005, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I
[BGBL. I] at 2437 (Ger.), available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/
bundesrecht/kapmug/gesamt.pdf.
76. It is unclear if reform efforts will result in an increasing or broader
application of the KapMuG. See Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Reform des Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahrensgesetzes, DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN UND PROTOKOLLE [BT] 17/8799 (Ger.), available at http://dipbt
.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/17/087/1708799.pdf; Referentenentwurf des Bundesministeriums der Justiz: Gesetz zur Reform des KapitalanlegerMusterverfahrensgesetzes, July 21, 2011 (Ger.), available at http://www.bmj
.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/pdfs/RefE_KapMuG.pdf?__blob=publicationFil
e; Stellungnahme des Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverbandes zum Gesetzesentwurf der Bundesregierung für ein Gesetz zur Reform des KapitalanlegerMusterverfahrensgesetzes,
Apr.
20,
2012
(Ger.),
available
at
http://www.bundestag.de/bundestag/ausschuesse17/a06/anhoerungen/archiv/
20_KapMug/04_Stellungnahmen/Stellungnahme_Westphal.pdf; AXEL HALFMEIER ET AL., ABSCHLUSSBERICHT: EVALUATION DES KAPITALANLEGERMUSTERVERFAHRENSGESETZES (Oct. 14, 2009), available at http://www.bmj.de/
SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/pdfs/Abschlussbericht_KapMuG_Frankfurt%
20School_2009.pdf?__blob=publicationFile;
Press
Release,
Deutscher
Bundestag, Experten uneinig über Zukunft von KapMuG und Musterverfahren, (Apr. 25, 2012), http://www.bundestag.de/presse/hib/2012_04/2012_
209/02.html.
77. LAG OM GRUPPRÄTTEGÅNG (Svensk författningssamling [SFS]
2002:599) [Group Proceedings Act] (Swed.), available at http://www.sweden
.gov.se/content/1/c6/02/77/67/bcbe1f4f.pdf.
78. Feess & Halfmeier, supra note 74, at 16.
79. See, e.g., In re Vivendi Universal Sec. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 512,
528–31 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding that Section 10(b) does not apply to duallisted securities where the purchase and sale did not arise from the domestic
listing).
80. See, e.g., Elliott Assocs. v. Porsche Auto. Holding SE, 759 F. Supp. 2d
469, 475–76 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (holding that Section 10(b) does not apply to secu-
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signed and marketed from one jurisdiction but executed in an81
other jurisdiction. In cases involving these situations plaintiffs and defendants will sometimes have sharp differences over
the geographic location of transactions. It is not at all certain
that U.S. courts will predictably apply the geographic test in
82
Morrison to these types of transactions. Furthermore, nonU.S. courts may apply a geographic test differently than the
U.S. case law. Non-U.S. courts could also respond to ambiguous
geography by rejecting geographic tests and resorting to a variation of the conduct and effects tests, or a similar “balancing”
formula. It is possible that both U.S. courts and courts of one or
more foreign countries could consider a transaction as taking
place within their individual borders. Alternatively, defendants
might successfully persuade courts in all jurisdictions that a
transaction took place outside their borders or for some other
reason outside their jurisdictions. Such a “no man’s land”
transaction would be governed by no law and there would be no
forum.
Finally, non-U.S. jurisdictions could choose to split off government enforcement from civil litigation as the United States
83
did in Section 929P of the Dodd-Frank Act. Bifurcated jurisdictional competition thus could lead some jurisdictions to exercise enforcement powers over a transaction that is subject to
civil litigation in only one, or perhaps none, of these jurisdictions. Misappropriation of confidential information in the United States for trading in German securities markets, for example, might give rise to a Section 929P(a) SEC enforcement
action or DOJ insider trading prosecution. At the same time,
such conduct could be subject to civil litigation or an insider
trading prosecution in Germany. If the misappropriated information originated in Italy, for example, Italian enforcement aurities-based swap agreements executed in the United States that reference
foreign-traded securities).
81. See, e.g., SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 790 F. Supp. 2d 147, 150–51
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding that Section 10(b) does not apply to securities marketed in the United States but sold in another country).
82. See Wulf A. Kaal & Richard W. Painter, The Aftermath of Morrison v.
National Australia Bank and Elliott Associates v. Porsche, 1 EUR. COMPANY &
FIN. L. REV. 77, 80–92 (2011) (discussing open questions and ambiguities related to Morrison’s geography test).
83. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 929P(a), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (allowing SEC civil enforcement against some
violations of federal securities law in some transactions outside the United
States).
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thorities could become involved as well. A difficult situation
could arise if the underlying facts constituted illegal insider
trading under U.S. law but did not violate the insider trading
laws of Italy or Germany. In that situation, the fact that the information—but not the securities—passed through the United
States might be sufficient to support a U.S. criminal prosecution for securities fraud. Civil suits and government enforcement would, however, be unlikely to occur in Italy and Germany because the conduct was not illegal in those countries.
Extraterritorial enforcement, however, is a game that several countries can play. One or more jurisdictions might enforce
their own laws against transactions in U.S. securities markets
that are legal under U.S. law but illegal under the laws of another jurisdiction (some forms of short selling might be an example). Criminal prosecution for the U.S. transactions could
ensue if the jurisdiction where the conduct is illegal has an extraterritorial enforcement provision similar to Section 929P of
84
the Dodd-Frank Act. Foreign governments could thus regulate
activity in U.S. markets, forcing some participants in those
markets to play by their rules. Other non-U.S. jurisdictions
might go even further and allow civil suits based on conduct in
U.S. markets.
This paper speculates about a few of the many possible
evolutionary paths for global securities law after Morrison.
Although a few patterns are emerging, particularly in the
Netherlands, it remains to be seen how European law will respond to the prospect of increased jurisdictional competition after Morrison, and whether the law of one or more European
countries will consistently reach transactions elsewhere. Other
regions besides Europe are outside the scope of this article, although we briefly discuss developments in Canada because
some securities litigation may move from the United States to
85
Canada after Morrison. These and other jurisdictions may join
84. See id. § 929P(b) (providing jurisdiction for extraterritorial violations
of the antifraud provisions of federal securities laws where conduct within the
United States significantly furthered the violation or where extraterritorial
conduct had a substantial effect within the United States).
85. There is some evidence that Canada may continue to increase its attractiveness for U.S. class action litigants. For example, Vivendi plaintiffs’
lawyer Michael Spencer, who practices in New York, has joined the Canadian
bar. According to Mr. Spencer, “[s]imply put, Canada presents a great opportunity.” Sandra Rubin, Top U.S. Class-Action Lawyer Coming to Canada,
GLOBE & MAIL (May 10, 2011), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on
-business/industry-news/the-law-page/top-us-class-action-lawyer-coming-to
-canada/article580187; see Tanya Monestier, Is Canada the New “Shangri-La”
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in the jurisdictional competition, seeking to attract either securities transactions or securities litigation or both within their
borders. It also remains to be seen how far the SEC and DOJ
will go with Section 929P, and whether other jurisdictions will
adopt a similar approach to extraterritorial enforcement.
A. THE PROLIFERATION OF EUROPEAN COLLECTIVE
PROCEDURES
Jurisdictions involved in Forum Competition attract one or
both of the parties to a transaction to choose that jurisdiction
as a forum for litigation. The United States engaged in some
Forum Competition for global securities litigation under the
conduct and effects tests, but the Morrison decision considerably narrowed the ability of the United States to provide a litigation forum for parties to non-U.S. transactions. There are
some indications that one or more European jurisdictions—
particularly the Netherlands—may provide some aspects of the
type of global securities forum that the Morrison court decided
would no longer be available in the United States.
Forum Competition in private litigation depends in part
upon procedural features that lawyers find attractive. Proplaintiff substantive law is also an important factor. One feature of the U.S. legal system that attracts lawyers is that litigants pay their own lawyers’ fees, whereas European cases, including collective procedures on behalf of multiple plaintiffs,
are usually governed by a “loser-pays” rule in which unsuccessful plaintiffs are responsible for successful defendants’ legal
fees. Another distinguishing procedural feature that makes the
United States attractive is the relative ease of class certification in class actions. The United States also allows certification
of “opt-out” classes in which individual class members must affirmatively opt-out of the class in order not to be bound by a
of Global Securities Class Actions?, 32 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. (forthcoming
2012) (manuscript at 4), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1929090; see also Pritchard & Sarra, supra note 25, at 892; Michael D. Goldhaber, Global Class Actions After Morrison v. National Australia
Bank, AM. LAW (Feb. 6, 2012), http://americanlawyer.com/PubArticleTAL
.jsp?id=1202541502514 (“The two leading candidates [for filing global class
actions] are Canada and [t]he Netherlands.”); Kevin LaCroix, Canadian Securities Class Action Lawsuit Filings Hit Record in 2011, D & O DIARY (Feb. 2,
2012),
http://www.dandodiary.com/2012/02/articles/securities-litigation/
Canadian-securities-class-action-lawsuit-filings-hit-record-in-2011. But see
Knutsen, supra note 25, at 153–55 (arguing that Ontario’s new securities legislation makes it more difficult for plaintiffs to bring successful securities class
actions).
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judgment or settlement of the action. European collective procedures approximate U.S. class actions in some ways but, as
discussed below, in other ways they fall short.
With respect to substantive law, one of the most attractive
features of U.S. securities litigation is the fraud-on-the-market
theory. This theory allows plaintiffs to show that they relied on
a market that was misled by defendants’ misrepresentations
instead of showing individual reliance by each plaintiff on the
86
defendants’ misrepresentations. The alternative approach,
adhered to in most other jurisdictions including in Europe, is to
require each plaintiff to show individual reliance on the defendants’ misrepresentations. This difference in substantive
law has an impact on procedural issues because class action litigation and collective procedures are easier if plaintiffs in the
class share common questions of law and fact. Common issues
are more predominant if the plaintiffs can succeed by showing
that they all relied upon the same market rather than individ87
ual reliance on the defendants’ misrepresentations.
Class action filings in the United States remain robust, despite efforts by both Congress and the federal courts to tighten
88
the requirements for plaintiffs. In recent years, some European jurisdictions have adjusted their laws, allowing for a type of
collective procedure that is similar to a U.S. securities class ac-

86. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 250 (1988).
87. See id. at 242, 245 (“Requiring proof of individualized reliance . . .
would have prevented . . . a class action, since individual issues then would
have overwhelmed the common ones.”).
88. See Securities Class Action Filings: 2011 Year in Review, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, 3–5 (2012), http://securities.stanford.edu/clearinghouse_
research/2011_YIR/Cornerstone_Research_Filings_2011_YIR.pdf. There are
varying explanations for the number of suits in the United States, including
the large number of financial frauds in the first decade of the twenty-first century, the significant investor losses in financial markets, and the fact that despite anti-plaintiff legislation and case law, the United States is still more favorable to plaintiffs, and their lawyers, than many other jurisdictions. Antiplaintiff legislation in the United States includes the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104 -67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.), and anti-plaintiff case law includes a series of cases rejecting Section 10(b) liability for aiding and abetting securities
fraud and for conspiring to commit securities fraud. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 160–61 (2008) (holding that conduct in
furtherance of a “scheme” of misrepresentation is not a basis for Section 10(b)
liability if the misrepresentation was not disclosed to the public); Cent. Bank
of Denver v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 177 (1994) (rejecting aiding
and abetting as a basis for Section 10(b) liability).
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89

tion. Following these developments, in 2007 the London-based
law firm Lovells LLP (now Hogan Lovells due to a 2010 merger) created a practice group focused on class actions in Eu90
rope. However, only some European countries, including the
United Kingdom, Poland, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, the
Netherlands, and Germany, have instituted a mass-claim pro91
cedure.
Most importantly, with the notable exception of the Neth92
erlands, European jurisdictions thus far have not been receptive to the fraud-on-the-market theory in securities litigation,
meaning that—unlike in the United States—each plaintiff in a
suit usually must show individual reliance on defendants’ alleged misrepresentations, a requirement that would make cer89. See infra notes 94–108 and accompanying text (discussing European
collective procedures).
90. See Werner R. Kranenburg, Lovells Dispute Lawyers Focus on Class
Actions, WITH VIGOUR & ZEAL: A EUROPEAN’S VIEWS ON SEC. LITIG. (Sept. 26,
2007, 2:29 AM), http://kranenburgesq.com/blog/2007/09/lovells-dispute-lawyers
-focus-on-class-actions (“The formation of the Class Actions Unit comes at a
time when a number of continental European jurisdictions have implemented
or are considering legislation to introduce new group litigation procedures.”);
see also Examples of U.S. Legal Community Interest in Europe, INST. FOR
REFORM,
U.S.
CHAMBER
OF
COMMERCE,
http://www
LEGAL
.instituteforlegalreform.com/sites/default/files/images2/stories/documents/pdf/
international/examplesofuslegalcommunityinterestineuroperev.pdf (“Several
of the most aggressive U.S. class action law firms are setting up offices in Europe, taking advantage of proposed class action laws at the EU and member
state levels.”); Aviva Freudmann, United We Stand, CORP. SEC’Y: GOVERNANCE, RISK & COMPLIANCE (May 1, 2007), http://www.corporatesecretary
.com/articles/case-studies/11756/united-we-stand (“To capitalize on the changes in European legislation governing class action lawsuits and litigation funding, several US law firms have set up European offices or established partnerships with European firms. In some cases, the firms are seeking European
plaintiffs to join existing US class actions, particularly in securities cases.”);
Alexia Garamfalvi, U.S. Firms Prepare for European Class Actions: As Europe
Becomes More Friendly to Private Suits, U.S. Law Firms Look to Capitalize on
Emerging Market, LAW.COM (June 25, 2007), http://www.law.com/jsp/article
.jsp?id=900005555895 (describing a law firm’s expectation that the class action market will significantly expand in Europe based on legal changes in several European countries, and due to the European Commission's interest in
private enforcement of competition law); Brendan Malkin, UK Firms Gear Up
as Class Action Culture Hits Europe, THE LAWYER (Feb. 7, 2005),
http://www.thelawyer.com/uk-firms-gear-up-as-class-action-culture-hits
-europe/113914.article (discussing an American law firm’s plans to launch securities class actions in Germany, Italy, and Poland after rule changes are
passed).
91. Feess & Halfmeier, supra note 74, at 13–14.
92. See infra Part III.B (discussing the promise of securities class actions
in the Netherlands).
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tification of a class or a similar procedure difficult. If, however, European jurisdictions dispense with the reliance requirement or develop some other mechanism for circumventing its
debilitating effect on class actions, European class actions could
begin to look much more like their U.S. counterparts.
There are some signs that European law could be moving
in this direction, although thus far there is no genuine European substitute for the U.S. securities class action under the
fraud-on-the-market theory. In 2005, the German legislature
introduced a collective procedure for securities actions, the
94
German Capital Markets Model Case Act (KapMuG). In the
Netherlands, the Dutch Act on the Collective Settlement of
95
Mass Claims (WCAM) was enacted on July 27, 2005. Sweden,
96
in 2002, adopted the Group Proceedings Act (GPA). Other
Scandinavian countries, such as Norway and Denmark, fol97
lowed the Swedish model with some alterations. Similarly,
the Italian legislature in 2009 introduced a proposal for a col98
lective procedure in securities actions. The introduction of European collective procedures, in conjunction with institutional
investors’ growing interest in such collective actions in Europe-

93. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 245 (“Requiring [individual
reliance] . . . would place an unnecessarily unrealistic evidentiary burden on
the Rule 10b-5 plaintiff.”).
94. KapMuG, Aug. 16, 2005, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL. I] at
2437 (Ger.), available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/
kapmug/gesamt.pdf. The KapMuG is applicable in proceedings before a court
of the first instance in which claimants assert: (1) claims for compensation of
damages due to false, misleading or omitted public capital markets information, or (2) claims for specific performance of a contract based on an offer
under the Securities Acquisition and Takeover Act. See id. at 2437, § 1(1).
95. WCAM, Stb. 2005, p. 340 (Neth.), available at http://www.eerstekamer
.nl/9370000/1/j9vvhwtbnzpbzzc/vh22drdk4jr7/f=y.pdf.
96. LAG OM GRUPPRÄTTEGÅNG (Svensk författningssamling [SFS]
2002:599) [Group Proceedings Act] (Swed.), available at http://www.sweden
.gov.se/content/1/c6/02/77/67/bcbe1f4f.pdf.
97. LOV OM MEKLING OG RETTERGANG I SIVILE TVISTER [Act Relating to
Mediation and Procedure in Civil Disputes], June 17, 2005, no. 90 (Nor.),
available at http://www.lovdata.no/all/hl-20050617-090.html; LOV OM
ÆNDRING AF RETSPLEJELOVEN OG FORSKELLIGE ANDRE LOVE (Gruppesøgsmål
m.v.), Feb. 28, 2007, no. 181 (Den.), available at https://www.retsinformation
.dk/forms/r0710.aspx?id=2593.
98. Legge 23 Luglio 2009, n. 99, art. 49 (It.), available at
http://www.parlamento.it/parlam/leggi/09099l.htm. The final draft went into
effect in January 2010. See also Cesare Cavallini, Azione collettiva risarcitoria
e controversie finanziarie, 2010 RIVISTA DELLE SOCIETÀ 1, 6.
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an states, and an increasing availability of litigation funding,
could, over time, make it more likely that collective procedures
in Europe become an attractive alternative for plaintiffs’ lawyers. Some of the cases they bring might involve non-European
plaintiffs and defendants, as well as securities transactions
taking place outside of Europe (the types of cases that in the
United States prior to Morrison were referred to as “foreign
cubed cases,” meaning that neither of the parties, nor the securities transaction, was within the United States).
European collective procedures for securities actions could
give institutional investors a greater opportunity to participate
in securities litigation if they are so inclined, or feel compelled
to participate in order to comply with their fiduciary duties. For
100
instance, under the German KapMuG, plaintiffs and defendants in Germany can file an application with the trial court to
101
establish a model case proceeding. Its purpose is to establish
the existence and validity of a claim and clarify the legal ques102
tions pertaining thereto.
The opt-in procedure under the
KapMuG provides that the higher regional court will open a
model case proceeding and select a lead plaintiff if, within four
months, at least ten applications for a model case proceeding
103
are filed in similar cases against the same defendant. Procedurally, the higher regional court is charged with the responsibility of finding one case among the ten applications that appropriately illustrates the factual and legal questions at issue
104
and must then hand down a judgment on the legal issues.
Rather than deciding all of the cases involving the same defendant, at that point, procedurally, the high court’s decision
becomes binding law for the trial courts in similar cases, and
the trial courts must apply the new rule to the remaining pend99. See Werner R. Kranenburg, What’s More: KapMuG, Lovells’ Class Actions, WITH VIGOUR & ZEAL: A EUROPEAN’S VIEWS ON SEC. LITIG. (Oct. 11,
2007, 11:52 PM), http://kranenburgesq.com/blog/2007/10/whats-more-kapmug
-lovells-class-actions.
100. KapMuG, Aug. 16, 2005, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL I] at
2437 (Ger.), available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/
kapmug/gesamt.pdf.
101. BURKHARD HESS ET AL., KÖLNER KOMMENTAR ZUM KAPMUG (Mathias
Casper et al., eds., 2008).
102. Id.
103. Mark C. Milgard & Jan Kraayvanger, Class Actions and Mass Actions
in Germany, LITIG. COMM. NEWSL. (Int’l Bar Ass’n Legal Practice Div., London), Sept. 2007, at 40, available at http://www.mayerbrown.com/public_docs/
Class_Actions_Mass_Actions_Germany.pdf.
104. See id.
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ing cases in the same matter individually. The KapMuG, however, does not discharge the trial judges from addressing the
legal issues in each and every case individually. Despite an
administratively burdensome process, the KapMuG does have
some advantages. For instance, the statute of limitation does
not start running for claimants in the same matter who have
not yet opted into the class. While the test case is litigated, the
other proceedings in the same matter against the same defendant are stayed. The KapMuG’s features seem to have encouraged several institutional investors, including non-German in105
stitutional investors, to file cases against Daimler AG, the
first case brought under the KapMuG.
Sweden’s GPA allows natural or legal persons to initiate
collective proceedings. Like the Dutch WCAM and the German
KapMuG, the GPA requires group members to share similar in106
terests pertaining to the action as the lead plaintiff. The GPA
includes an opt-in procedure and the ruling is only legally binding for members of the class who did in fact opt-in and the lead
107
plaintiff alone is party to the court proceeding. Similar to
contingent-fee arrangements in the United States, the GPA introduces risk agreements that allow attorneys to charge fees
conditional on their success in the suit. The reluctance of Swedish attorneys to work within such an arrangement could per108
haps be one reason for the lack of group actions in Sweden.
So far, the German KapMuG seems to be the only coherent
attempt at establishing a procedure to address collectivesecurities claims. Another jurisdiction that may develop law to
facilitate collective procedures is the Netherlands.
105. See Oberlandesgericht Stuttgart [OLG] [Stuttgart Higher Regional
Court] Feb. 2, 2007, 901 Kap 1/06 (Ger.), available at http://lrbw.juris.de/cgibin/laender_rechtsprechung/document.py?Gericht=bw&Art=en&GerichtAusw
ahl=OLG+Stuttgart&az=901; Press Release, Oberlandesgerichts Stuttgart,
Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahren gegen DaimlerChrysler AG vor dem
Oberlandesgericht Stuttgart (July 13, 2006), http://www.olg-stuttgart.de/
servlet/PB/menu/1200878/index.html; Press Release, Oberlandesgerichts
Stuttgart, Oberlandesgericht Stuttgart Entscheidet im Kapitalanlegermuster
verfahren zu Gunsten der Daimler AG (Apr. 22, 2009), http://www.olg
-stuttgart.de/servlet/PB/menu/1241538/indx.html.
106. See Feess & Halfmeier, supra note 74, at 15.
107. See id. This minimizes transaction costs in accordance with the U.S.
model. The KapMuG does not allow lead plaintiffs per se. KapMuG, Aug. 16,
2005, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL I] at 2437 (Ger.), available at
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/kapmug/gesamt.pdf.
108. See Feess & Halfmeier, supra note 74, at 16 (“Swedish attorneys are
traditionally very reluctant to work on a contingency fee basis.”).
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B. THE NETHERLANDS AS A FORUM FOR MULTI-NATIONAL
SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS
To compete with the United States in the aftermath of the
Morrison decision, procedural and substantive rules in the
Netherlands no longer need to be as attractive to non-U.S.
transaction plaintiffs as when these plaintiffs had the option of
suing in the United States (under Morrison, plaintiffs suing
over securities transactions outside the United States can no
109
longer sue under Section 10(b), and for other reasons plaintiffs may not be successful suing under state law or under nonU.S. law in U.S. courts). To attract plaintiffs in non-U.S. transactions, the Netherlands only has to compete with other jurisdictions that will entertain the same suits. If the Netherlands
also seeks to attract parties to U.S. transactions as plaintiffs,
the Netherlands will have to provide some litigation features
that are comparable to what is available in the United States.
The Dutch Act on the Collective Settlement of Mass Claims
110
(WCAM),
discussed below, as well as the Fortis and
Converium cases, also discussed below, illustrate how influential the Dutch securities litigation regime could become.
1. The Dutch Act on the Collective Settlement of Mass Claims
As discussed above, one or more jurisdictions could offer
Forum Competition separate from the operative law which
111
could be that of a different jurisdiction. One context in which
a jurisdiction’s courts could apply another jurisdiction’s law to
securities transactions could be settlement agreements that are
brought to a jurisdiction’s courts for approval and enforcement.
The Netherlands is probably Europe’s most successful venue for enforcing foreign settlements. Other European countries
are hesitant to allow a collective settlement in a mass litigation
112
case to be binding on all class members. Dutch courts regu109. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2881–83 (2010).
110. WCAM, Stb. 2005, p. 340 (Neth.), available at http://www.eerstekamer
.nl/9370000/1/j9vvhwtbnzpbzzc/vh22drdk4jr7/f=y.pdf; see Burgerlijk Wetboek
[BW] (Civil Code) art. 3:305a (Neth.), translated in Dutch Civil Code, BRECHT,
http://www.dutchcivillaw.com/civilcodegeneral.htm (permitting a collective
cause of action to “protect similar interests of other persons”); id. art. 7:907
(listing requirements and limitations of damages awards in collective action
suits).
111. See supra note 15.
112. See, e.g., HÉLÈNE VAN LITH, THE DUTCH COLLECTIVE SETTLEMENTS
ACT AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 127–28 (2011), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2011_collective_redress/saw_
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larly apply foreign law on the basis of the Rome I Regulations
114
and other international regulations. A decision by a Dutch
court in this context is generally recognized in other European
115
member states. The recognition and enforcement of class action settlements in the Netherlands could foreshadow future
116
developments in other areas of the law.
An important reason for the Dutch success in this area is
117
the Dutch WCAM. The class-settlement procedures provided
by the WCAM strongly resemble class action settlements in the
118
United States. Similar to U.S.-style class actions, interested
parties, i.e., parties to the settlement, do not have to opt-in in
order to become a party to the settlement but they may opt-out
annex_en.pdf (discussing Germany’s reluctance to recognize opt-out class action decisions); see generally Ruud Hermans & Jan de Bie Leuveling Tjeenk,
International Class Action Settlements in the Netherlands Since Converium, in
THE INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE LEGAL GUIDE TO: CLASS AND GROUP ACTIONS 2012, available at http://www.debrauw.com/sitecollectiondocuments/
CA12_de-brauw_ver3%202011.pdf (discussing class action settlements in the
Netherlands and issues of enforceability in other European countries).
113. Regulation (EC) No. 593/2008 on the Law Applicable to Contractual
Obligations (Rome I), 2008 O.J. (L 177) 6, available at http://eur-lex.europa
.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:177:0006:0006:en:PDF; see also
Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (Rome Convention), 1980 O.J. (L 266) 1 (EC), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:1980:266:0001:0010:EN:PDF.
114. Rob Polak & Ruud Hermans, International Class Action Settlements in
the Netherlands After the Morrison and Ahold Decisions, in THE INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE LEGAL GUIDE TO: CLASS AND GROUP ACTIONS 2011, at 9.
115. See Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 of 22 Dec. 2000 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (Brussels I), 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1, available at http://eur-lex
.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2001:012:0001:0023:EN:PDF;
VAN LITH, supra note 112, at 127–28; Tomas Arons & Willem H. van Boom,
Beyond Tulips and Cheese: Exporting Mass Securities Claim Settlements from
the Netherlands, 21 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 857, 876, 880–82; Hermans & de Bie
Leuveling Tjeenk, supra note 112, ¶¶ 36–37; Legal Alert Converium, supra
note 34.
116. Arons & van Boom, supra note 115, at 857, 875; Polak & Hermans,
supra note 114, at 6; Michael Goldhaber, ‘Shell Model’ Opens Door to European Class Actions, LAW.COM (Jan. 7, 2008), http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/
PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1199700328427 (“[T]he Netherlands [is] becoming a mecca for European class action settlements, in the way that Delaware has become a destination for bankruptcy law.”).
117. WCAM, Stb. 2005, p. 340 (Neth.), available at http://www.eerstekamer
.nl/9370000/1/j9vvhwtbnzpbzzc/vh22drdk4jr7/f=y.pdf.
118. See Brechje van der Velden, Shell Non-U.S. Settlement Declared Binding by Dutch Court, ALLEN & OVERY (Dec. 16, 2009), http://www.allenovery
.com/publications/en-gb/Pages/Shell-non-U-S--settlement-declared-binding-by
-Dutch-court.aspx.
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119

of the settlement. Unlike U.S. class action procedures, the
WCAM does not provide a legal basis for bringing or maintain120
ing class actions seeking monetary damages. It merely provides procedures to settle claims between the defendants and a
121
foundation representing the interests of the injured party.
The WCAM gives the Amsterdam Court of Appeal exclusive ju122
risdiction to certify settlements in WCAM cases. The court’s
decision pertaining to a settlement is binding for the plaintiffs,
and plaintiffs can only appeal the court’s decision in limited cir123
cumstances. The WCAM does not provide specific guidance
124
on the distribution of proceeds or the calculation of damages.
However, an integral part of the settlement considerations is
an evaluation of procedural and substantive fairness and the
125
efficiency of the settlement. The WCAM, thus, avoids blackmail settlements in which a defendant offers a payment to get
out of a class action to avoid the prospect of endless proceedings
126
and reputational loss in the process. Given the procedural
tools provided by the WCAM, the Act is an effective tool that
multinational corporations can use to obtain global solutions
for disputes involving multinational parties throughout the
world.
2. Increasing Relevance of Dutch Courts
Since the introduction of the WCAM in 2005, settlements
under the WCAM have ranged from capital markets and finan119. Willem H. van Boom, Collective Settlement of Mass Claims in The
Netherlands, in AUF DEM WEG ZU EINER EUROPÄISCHEN SAMMELKLAGE? 178–
79 (Matthias Casper et al., eds., 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1456819.
120. Arjan de Boode & Allard Huizing, The Netherlands as an Alternative
Forum for Cross Border Class Settlements and the Potential Consequences for
Claims by ‘Foreign Cubed’ Plaintiffs Under U.S. Securities Laws,
GREENBERGTRAURIG (Jan. 14, 2010), http://www.gtlaw.com/News-Events/
Publications/Alerts/132898/The-Netherlands-as-an-Alternative-Forum-for
-Cross-Border-Class-Settlements-and-the-Potential-Consequences-for-Claims
-by-Foreign-Cubed-Plaintiffs-under-US-Securities-Laws.
121. van Boom, supra note 119, at 178–79.
122. WCAM, Stb. 2005, p. 304, available at http://www.eerstekamer.nl/
9370000/1/j9vvhwtbnzpbzzc/vh22drdk4jr7/f=y.pdf; Wetboek van Burgerlijke
Rechtsvordering [Rv] (CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE) art. 1013(3) (Neth.), translated in Code of Civil Procedure, BRECHT, http://www.dutchcivillaw.com/
civilprocedureleg.htm.
123. van Boom, supra note 119, at 179.
124. See de Boode & Huizing, supra note 120.
125. Id.
126. See id.
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cial services cases to pharmaceutical liability suits. Cases in
128
this context have involved personal injury, failure to warn
129
about risks of retail investment products, bankruptcy of a life
130
131
insurance company, and securities fraud.
Shell was the first in a line of cases involving the enforce132
ment of international settlements in the Netherlands. Shell
was the first WCAM case with a substantial international
133
scope. As a result of mass claims initiated in the United
States, Shell entered into settlements regarding the re134
categorization and restatement of its oil and gas reserves.
The Shell settlement is noteworthy because investors from all
135
over the world were involved. The fourteen securities class
actions filed by investors in the United States were consolidat136
ed.
However, the U.S. court also had to rule on claims
brought by plaintiffs who were not American residents and had
137
bought Shell stock on European stock exchanges. Before the
American court issued a final ruling in which the court declared its incompetence to hear the claims, Shell reached a set138
tlement with the non-U.S. investors under the WCAM. The
Amsterdam Court of Appeal, in a landmark decision on May 29,
127. See Ianika Tzankova & Daan L. Scheurleer, The Netherlands, 622
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 149, 155 (2009).
128. See Hof ’s-Amsterdam 1 juni 2006, NJ 2006, 461 (Farmaceutische
bedrijven en verzekeraars enerzijds/Stichting DES Centrum) (Neth.).
129. See Hof ’ s-Amsterdam 25 januari 2007, JOR 2007, 71 (Stichting
Leaseverlies/Dexia) (Neth.).
130. See Hof ’s-Amsterdam 29 april 2009, JOR 2009, 196 (Stichting
Pensioen-en Verzekeringskamer en Staat/Vie d’Or) (Neth.).
131. See Hof ’s-Amsterdam 15 juli 2009, JOR 2009, 325 (VEB/Vedior)
(Neth.) (pertaining to shareholder allegations of securities fraud related to
merger and acquisition); Converium COA Decision, supra note 32 (addressing
shareholder allegations of securities fraud related to failure to accurately disclose loss reserves).
132. Hof ’s-Amsterdam 29 mei 2009, JOR 2009, 197 (VEB/Shell) (Neth.); see
also Polak & Hermans, supra note 114, at 6 (“[N]ow that ‘foreign cubed class
actions’ have been made impossible in the United States . . . the Netherlands
may be the place to certify a class action settlement involving non-US investors in non-US securities listed on a non-US stock exchange.”).
133. Polak & Hermans, supra note 114, at 7.
134. See Van der Velden, supra note 118.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. (“An important consideration of the court was, apart from the fact
that the damaging facts had not taken place in the United States (the socalled conduct test), that it was ‘significant’ that meanwhile an arrangement
had been made for this group of investors under the Dutch WCAM.”).

2012]

169

COMPETITION IN SECURITIES LAW
139

2009, approved $381 million in settlement awards. The U.S.
court, in declining to hear the case, emphasized that non-U.S.
investors could rely on the Dutch WCAM to address alleged in140
juries. Similarly, the decision by an Amsterdam district court
141
in Ahold on June 23, 2010 also involved a U.S. class action
142
settled in the Netherlands. The Dutch court recognized the
143
U.S. class action settlement and enforced it worldwide. The
court in Ahold held that the U.S. system adequately safeguarded the interests of the injured parties because investors belong144
ing to the class could opt-out of the collective settlement.
Shell and Ahold are important decisions on the international application of the WCAM, showing that Dutch courts
may have jurisdiction over all interested parties, regardless of
their respective domicile. The decisions in Fortis and
Converium, discussed below, illustrate that claims under Dutch
law will likely increase and the jurisdiction of Dutch courts will
likely expand.
a. Fortis
145

Copeland v. Fortis, a case that had originally been filed
in the Southern District of New York but was later dismissed
139. See Ben Hallman, Dutch Court Approves Landmark Royal Dutch Shell
Shareholder ‘Class Action,’ AM. LAW., http://www.americanlawyer.com/
digestTAL.jsp?id=1202431087599&slreturn=20120807141744; see also Legal
Alert, Shell: Landmark Decision Regarding International Collective Settlement
of Mass Claims, DE BRAUW BLACKSTONE WESTBROEK, 3 (June 2, 2009),
http://www.debrauw.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/Legal%20Alerts/Litigation
%20Arbitration/Legal%20Alert%20Shell.pdf (“[S]ome connection with the
Netherlands appears to be required in any event, for example: the presence of
some interested persons in the Netherlands and one or more Dutch petitioners, such as the foundation or association representing the interested persons.
The Court confirmed in this ruling that it has jurisdiction in case (i) not all
potentially liable parties were residing in the Netherlands and (ii) the vast
majority of the potential claimants were not residing in the Netherlands. It is
expected that in the near future the possibilities of the WCAM for application
in international collective settlements will be further explored.”).
140. In re Royal Dutch/Shell Transport Sec. Litig., 522 F. Supp. 2d 712,
723–24 (D.N.J. 2007).
141. Hof ’s-Amsterdam 23 juni 2010, JOR 2010, 225 (Ahold) (Neth.).
142. See Legal Alert, Recognition of a U.S. Class Action Settlement in the
Netherlands (Royal Ahold N.V.), DE BRAUW BLACKSTONE WESTBROEK (June
28, 2010), http://www.debrauw.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/Legal%20Alerts/
Litigation%20Arbitration/LA%20Recognition%20of%20a%20US%20%
20Class%20Action%20Settlement%20in%20the%20Netherlands.pdf.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Copeland v. Fortis, 685 F. Supp. 2d 498, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
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under the now obsolete effects test, suggests that Dutch courts
146
may continue to expand their jurisdiction and influence. In
Copeland v. Fortis, the purchases of American Depository Receipts (ADRs) (a dollar denominated version of a non-U.S. security) via an over-the-counter transaction did not qualify for Sec147
tion 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 protection. According to the court,
trading “in ADRs is considered to be a predominantly foreign
148
securities transaction.”
Under Dutch law, foundations can bring collective actions
149
on behalf of investors. After the Fortis case was dismissed in
the United States, a group of international investors who were
affected by the case, the Stichting Investor Claims Against For150
tis
(the “Foundation”), in January 2011, filed a Writ in
146. See Fortis Writ, supra note 29. Under the now obsolete effects test,
U.S. courts granted subject matter jurisdiction in cases where fraudulent acts
committed abroad resulted “in injury to purchasers or sellers of those securities in whom the United States has an interest, not where acts simply have an
adverse affect [sic] on the American economy or American investors generally.” Parks v. Fairfax Fin. Holding Ltd., No. 06-CV-2820 (GBD), 2010 WL
1372537, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2010) (quoting Bersch v. Drexel Firestone,
Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 989 (2d Cir. 1975)).
147. Copeland, 685 F. Supp. 2d at 506. Much of the Court’s analysis in this
case is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s June 2010 holding in Morrison.
Compare id., with Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S.Ct. 2869 (2010).
148. Copeland, 685 F. Supp. 2d at 506.
149. See VAN LITH, supra note 112, at 16; Hermans & de Bie Leuveling
Tjeenk, supra note 112, ¶ 6; Karen Jelsma & Manon Cordewener, The Settlement of Mass Claims: A Hot Topic in The Netherlands, INT’L L. Q., Summer
2011, at 13, available at http://www.hoganlovells.com/files/Publication/035a19d4 -

5aa9-4e43-b651-363f3031a0b9/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/28345212-16e0
-43be-9bcd-4199cce6ca23/The_Settlement_of_Mass_Claims_A_Hot_Topic_in_The_
Netherlands.pdf; Polak & Hermans, supra note 114, at 8; Dutch Response to the

Public Consultation on a Coherent European Framework for Collective Redress, EUR. COMM’N (2011), http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/
2011_collective_redress/nl_gov_en.pdf; Scott Hirst, Dutch Court Decision Impacts Global Securities Class Actions, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE &
FIN. REG. (Feb. 18, 2012, 10:08 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/
2012/02/18/dutch-court-decision-impacts-global-securities-class-actions/ (“The
Dutch Act [WCAM] permits an alleged wrongdoer, irrespective of whether any
litigation is pending, to enter into a contract with a foundation that represents
the interests of a purportedly injured group or class. Pursuant to that contract, the wrongdoer agrees to compensate the foundation for the injuries suffered by the group. The foundation and the alleged wrongdoer then submit the
executed contract (or settlement agreement) to the Amsterdam Court of Appeal and request that the Court order the contract binding on all members of
the class. The class members are given an opportunity to object to the agreement. If the Court declares the contract binding, class members are bound by
the settlement unless they opt out and initiate individual proceedings.”).
150. The Foundation was established as an “open foundation” under article
3:305a of the Dutch Civil Code and is seeking to represent investors who in-
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151

Utrecht District Court.
They sued Fortis, now known as
152
Ageas NV (“Fortis”), and Merrill Lynch alleging that they
materially misled investors between May 2007 and September
153
2008. The writ alleges that Fortis, its officers and directors,
154
and its underwriter, Merrill Lynch International P.U.C.,
vested in Fortis from May 29, 2007 through October 14, 2008. Home,
STICHTING INVESTOR CLAIMS AGAINST FORTIS, http://investorclaimsagainst
fortis.com/index.php (last visited Oct. 21, 2012).
151. The Court’s jurisdiction is based on Fortis N.V.’s registered seat and
the fact that Fortis S.A./N.V.’s actions are inextricably linked with the actions
of Fortis N.V. Fortis Writ, supra note 29, § 4 ¶¶ 16–17; see Rv art. 6–7 (Neth.),
translated in Code of Civil Procedure, BRECHT, http://www.dutchcivillaw
.com/civilprocedureleg.htm (pertaining to regulation on the jurisdiction and
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters).
152. Fortis was comprised of two companies. Fortis N.V. was a Dutch holding company of the former Dutch-Belgian Fortis banking and insurance conglomerate (now known as Ageas N.V.). Fortis S.A./N.V. was a Belgian holding
company of the former Dutch-Belgian Fortis banking and insurance conglomerate (now known as Ageas S.A./N.V.). Together, Fortis N.V. and Fortis
S.A./N.V. formed the conglomerate, Fortis Group (“dual set-up” whereby two
companies headed the group). See Fortis Writ, supra note 29, § 2.2 ¶ 5, § 5.1
¶¶ 25–27.
153. See id. § 1 ¶¶ 1–2, § 2.1 ¶ 4. The Foundation relies heavily upon the
Report on the Investigation into Fortis N.V. dated June 15, 2010, see F.J.G.M.
Cremers et al., Verslag van het Onderzoek naar Fortis N.V. (2010) (Neth.),
available
at
http://www.ageas.com/Documents/NL_final_report_dutch_
investigation_20100616.pdf, the Fortis Governance Statements dated January
25, 2008, see Fortis Governance Statement, FORTIS (2008), http://www.csr-news
.net/directory/ebook/4199/files/4199.pdf, the AFM penalty rulings dated February 5, 2010, see AFM legt boetes op aan Fortis voor marktmanipulatie en niet
tijdig publiceren koersgevoelige informatie, AFM (Neth.), http://www.afm
.nl/nl/professionals/afm-actueel/nieuws/2010/mrt/boete-fortis.aspx, and dated
August 19, 2010, see AFM legt boete op aan Ageas, voorheen Fortis, voor niet
tijdig publiceren koersgevoelige informatie, AFM (Neth.), http://www.afm.nl/nl/
professionals/afm-actueel/nieuws/2010/aug/boete-ageas.aspx, and other public
information in its allegations against Fortis and Merrill Lynch. The Foundation also alleges that Fortis acted unlawfully by failing to invoke the MAC
clause. Fortis Writ, supra note 29, § 6.3 ¶¶ 330–47. The MAC Clause in the
ABN AMRO offer proposal defines a material adverse change as “any event,
event or circumstance that results or could reasonably be expected to result in
a material adverse effect on the business, cash flow, financial or trading position, assets, profits, operational performance, capitalization, prospects or activities of any . . . [h]oldings, . . . taken as a whole.” Id. § 5.2 ¶ 92. Prior to being bound by the offer, Fortis had the option of invoking the MAC Clause
based on the deteriorating conditions in the financial market. Fortis did not
invoke the Clause because of possible legal ramifications (litigation and reputation risk). Id. § 5.2 ¶¶ 100–03.
154. The Foundation alleges that Merrill Lynch breached its duty of due
care based on article 6:162 of the Dutch Civil Code. Fortis Writ, supra note 29,
§ 6.4 ¶ 358; see also BW art. 6:162 (Neth.), translated in Dutch Civil Code,
BRECHT, http://www.dutchcivillaw.com/legislation/dcctitle6633.htm. Specifically, Merrill Lynch, while officiating as coordinator in two of Fortis’ share issues,
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made material misrepresentations concerning Fortis’s financial
155
condition in the fall of 2007 until the Dutch, Belgian, and
Luxembourg governments orchestrated a bailout to save For156
157
tis. The Fortis bailout was valued at over €11 billion. According to the complaint, after raising €13 billion in a 2007
rights offering, Fortis hid its significant exposure to U.S. sub158
prime loans and overrepresented its financial health, which
resulted in a depreciation of shareholder equity by €26.2 bil159
160
lion. The Plaintiffs alleged that the Defendants misrepresented the extent of assets held as subprime-related mortgage
161
backed securities, the value of its collateralized debt obliga162
tions, and the impact of Fortis’s ABN AMRO acquisition on
163
its solvency. Because of these fraudulent misrepresentations,

failed to stop Fortis from making inaccurate statements and did not rectify the
misleading statements. See Fortis Writ, supra note 29, § 1 ¶ 2. Regarding the
share issue dated September 20, 2007, Merrill Lynch knew about the actual
sub-prime situation at Fortis and that it departed from the description made
in the Prospectus and the communications vis-à-vis the market, yet failed to
prevent or rectify the inaccurate information. Id. § 6.4 ¶¶ 352–58. Regarding
the share issue dated June 26, 2008, Merrill Lynch knew or should have
known that comments made by Fortis in newspapers were inaccurate and inconsistent with the actual situation, yet failed to stop these statements or rectify them. Id. § 6.4 ¶¶ 359–68.
155. See id. § 8 ¶ 375; see also Press Release, Reuters, International Investors Join Forces in Support of Lawsuit Against Fortis over Massive Misrepresentation Ahead of Bank's Collapse in 2008 (Jan. 10, 2011), available at
http://www.investorclaimsagainstfortis.com/Attachment/193_Reuters%20
-%20International%20Investors%20Join%20Forces%20in%20Support%20of%
20Lawsuit%20Against%20Fortis%20-%2020110110%20(00027443).PDF [hereinafter Reuters Press Release].
156. See Fortis Writ, supra note 29, § 5.5 ¶ 182, § 6 ¶ 194.
157. Reuters Press Release, supra note 155.
158. Fortis Writ, supra note 29, § 5.2 ¶ 42, § 6.1 ¶ 216.
159. STICHTING INVESTOR CLAIMS AGAINST FORTIS, supra note 150.
160. See Fortis Writ, supra note 29, § 2.3 ¶¶ 7–11 (identifying key ex-board
members at Fortis as responsible for making material misrepresentations to
potential investors).
161. From May to October 2007, Fortis made inaccurate and incomplete
disclosures regarding its sub-prime exposure and its liquidity and solvency in
(1) the press release dated August 9, 2007, (2) the Trading Update, and (3) the
Prospectus. Id. § 5.2 ¶¶ 36–109, § 6.1 ¶¶ 215–47.2 (relating to the 2007 Fortis
offer to take over ABN AMRO in a consortium with Royal Bank of Scotland
Plc. and Spain’s Banco Santander S.A.).
162. From early 2008 to June 26, 2008, Fortis engaged in misrepresentations regarding its solvency, the implementation of its solvency plan, and the
dividend policy. Id. § 5.3 ¶¶ 110–51, § 6.1 ¶¶ 248–87.
163. From June 26, 2008 to September 26, 2008, Fortis engaged in misrepresentations regarding its solvency status, the negative impact in terms of sol-
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investors claim to have lost up to ninety percent of their in164
vestment.
The Foundation bases its claims on Sections 6:193a–j (un165
166
fair trade practices) and 6:194 (misrepresentation) of the
Dutch Civil Code. Under Sections 6:193a–j, an unfair or misleading trade practice occurs if the information furnished to investors is factually inaccurate or is misleading to the average
167
consumer, and results in the consumer making a decision he
168
or she would not otherwise have made. A misleading trade
practice also occurs where essential information is omitted or is
formulated in an unclear, incomprehensible, or ambiguous
169
manner. Section 6:194 applies to information contained in the
prospectus as well as written or oral communications made in
170
connection with the offer of securities (emphasis added). In
determining whether a prospectus is misleading, courts use the
“presumed expectation of an averagely informed, cautious and
171
observant investor.” Under Dutch law,
it does not matter whether the ‘reference investor’ has effectively taken cognizance of or has been influenced by the communication; all
that matters is that the inaccuracy or incompleteness of the communication should be sufficiently significant materially to have been
misleading to the ‘reference investor.’ What matters therefore is
whether the inaccurate/incomplete communication per se is mislead172
ing.
vency of the failure of the Ping An transaction, and its evaporated liquidity.
Id. § 5.4 ¶¶ 152–79, § 6.1 ¶¶ 288–310.
164. STICHTING INVESTOR CLAIMS AGAINST FORTIS, supra note 150.
165. Fortis Writ, supra note 29, ¶ 199. Sections 193a–j apply to actions performed vis-à-vis natural persons, i.e., private investors. Id.
166. Id. ¶ 205. Section 194 applies to non-consumers, i.e., institutional investors. Id.
167. Id. ¶ 204. “It is not the characteristics and properties of the individual
consumer . . . that are decisive . . . but rather, those of the fictitious consumer
who is representative of the specific group . . . .” Id. Case law from the European Court of Justice describes the average consumer as the “reasonably informed, cautious and observant consumer.” Id.
168. Id. ¶ 201. This is considered proactive dissemination of information.
Id.
169. Id. ¶ 202. Non-disclosure of information required by Sections 13 and
20 of Part 5 of the Financial Supervision Act gives rise to unfair trade practices as defined in Sections 6:193a–j of the Dutch Civil Code. Id. ¶ 203.
170. Id. ¶ 209. See also HR 27 november 2009, JOR 2010, 43 m.nt. K.
Frielink (VEB e.a./World Online e.a.) (Neth.), available at http://zoeken
.rechtspraak.nl/detailpage.aspx?ljn=BH2162.
171. Fortis Writ, supra note 29, ¶ 210 (quoting HR 30 mei 2008, JOR 2008,
209 m.nt. BJJ (Claimants/TMF Financial Services BV) (Neth.)).
172. Id. ¶¶ 211–12 (“Once the communication has been established as being misleading, and as such unlawful, the misrepresentation has also been es-
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The Foundation also alleges that Fortis violated Sections
5:13, 20, 25i, and 58(1) of the Dutch Financial Supervision
173
Act. Section 5:13 stipulates that the prospectus should “contain all data which is necessary . . . to enable investors to make
an informed assessment of the assets and liabilities, financial
position, profits and losses and prospects of the issuer and of
any guarantor, and of the rights and obligations attached to
174
such securities.” Section 20 prohibits statements that are not
175
in line with the prospectus. Section 25i requires organizations to disclose price-sensitive information related to the or176
ganization. Section 58(1) bans market manipulation through
the dissemination of information (potentially) giving out inactablished as having contributed to the investment decision. In other words, the
(professional or private) investor would not have bought shares, or would not
have bought shares on the same terms, had the ill-fated communication not
been made.”).
173. Id. ¶ 195; see Wet op het Financieel Toezicht [Wft] [Financial Supervision Act] § 5:13 (Neth.), translated in Engelse vertaling van de Wft,
RIJKSOVERHEID (Oct. 12, 2006), http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en
-publicaties/brieven/2009/11/16/engelse-vertaling-van-de-wft.html.
174. Wft § 5:13. In World Online, the Supreme Court explained the purpose
of the Act. The Act seeks to protect private and institutional investors alike so
that they have “greater confidence in the securities market” and to ensure “the
market’s proper performance.” Fortis Writ, supra note 29, ¶ 316 (quoting HR
27 november 2009, JOR 2010, 43 m.nt. K. Frielink (VEB e.a./World Online
e.a.) (Neth.), available at http://zoeken.rechtspraak.nl/detailpage.aspx?ljn=
BH2162).
175. Fortis Writ, supra note 29, ¶ 318.
176. Id. ¶ 321 (noting that price-sensitive information is “any information
which a reasonably acting investor would probably” use to base his investment
decision on (quoting Directive 2003/124/EC, of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 22 December 2003 Implementing Directive 2003/6/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council as Regards the Definition and Public
Disclosure of Inside Information and the Definition of Market Manipulation,
2003 O.J. (L339) 1(2)). The purpose of Section 25i is to prevent insider trading.
Id. ¶ 321. The AFM imposed penalties on Fortis for non-timely disclosure of
price-sensitive information regarding the transaction involving Deutsche Bank
and communications related to Fortis’s sub-prime related exposure in 2007.
Id. ¶ 323; see also Evan Weinberger, Fortis Dutch Fraud Suit Could Enable
Non-US Claims, LAW 360 (Jan. 10, 2011), available at http://
investorclaimsagainstfortis.com/Attachment/192_Law360%20-%20Fortis%
20Dutch%20Fraud%20Suit%20Could%20Enable%20Non-US%20Claims%20
-%2020110111%20(00027266).PDF. The subprime exposure “caused shareholder equity in Fortis to fall from €33 billion . . . to . . . €6.8 billion . . . over 12
months following the rights offering. According to the [F ]oundation, investors
lost up to 90 percent of their investment in Fortis due to the fraud . . . . A joint
investigation by the Dutch Authority for the Financial Markets and the Belgian Banking, Finance and Insurance Commission found in February that
Fortis engaged in market manipulation by issuing false and misleading
statements prior to the ABN Amro rights offering.” Id.
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curate or misleading signals regarding the availability of, de177
mand for or share price of financial instruments.
The sections of Dutch law cited in the previous two paragraphs give a flavor of the substantive legal rules available to
plaintiffs’ attorneys who choose to file lawsuits in the Netherlands. Combined, these sections approximate legal protections
available in the United States under Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5. Given the comparability, the Dutch legal system could
present a possible avenue for circumventing the restrictions
imposed by the Morrison decision. Investors who lost money in
transactions on foreign exchanges and are prohibited from
claiming damages in U.S. court under Morrison may find that
178
the Netherlands constitutes an attractive venue. Investors
could make use of the Dutch law that permits foundations under Article 3:305a of the Dutch Civil Code to sue on behalf of
179
investors. It also seems possible that other countries, such as
Canada, will capitalize on plaintiffs’ willingness to pursue other
180
venues.
The Fortis case illustrates that lawsuits filed in Dutch
courts based on legal claims under Dutch law can largely mirror the claims and allegations in previously dismissed lawsuits

177. Fortis Writ, supra note 29, ¶ 326. The AFM imposed penalties on Fortis based on its misrepresentations over the period from January 27, 2008 to
June 26, 2008 regarding Fortis’s solvency, solvency plan implementation, and
dividend policy. Id. ¶¶ 327–28.
178. David Bario, Dutch Treat? With Doors to U.S. Courts Closed by Morrison, Securities Class Action Lawyers Sue Fortis in Holland, AM. LAW. (Jan. 10,
2011), http://www.americanlawyer.com/PubArticleTAL.jsp?id=1202477589137
&Dutch_Treat_With_Doors_to_US_Courts_Closed_by_Morrison_Securities_
Class_Action_Lawyers_Sue_Fortis_in_Holland&slreturn=20120806213334
(quoting Jay Eisenhofer, co-managing partner of Grant & Eisenhofer, as saying: “[o]ur clients are increasingly looking for forums where they’re going to be
able to receive compensation for their non-U.S. losses,” and adding that “we’re
looking at other cases that are in various stages of analysis”).
179. Reuters Press Release, supra note 155 (quoting Jay Eisenhofer as saying: “[t]he foundation's action in the Netherlands offers an innovative avenue
to address securities fraud claims outside the U.S. following the restrictions
imposed on international investors by the Supreme Court's decision in Morrison v. NAB. We believe this action could be a model for future investor claims
outside the United States”).
180. Bradley A. Heys & Mark L. Berenblut, Trends in Canadian Securities
Class Actions: 2011 Update, NERA (Jan. 31, 2012), available at http://www
.nera.com/nera-files/PUB_Recent_Trends_Canada_2011_0412.pdf; Filings of
Securities Class Actions in Canada Reach New High, BUS. WIRE (Feb. 1,
2012), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20120201005968/en/FilingsSecurities-Class-Actions-Canada-ReachHigh; LaCroix, supra note 85.
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under U.S. law. The decision in Fortis is still pending. The
case may proceed to a claims phase if the foundation succeeds
in establishing liability.
b. Converium
The Amsterdam Court of Appeal in its Converium decision
declared an international collective settlement binding on the
parties to a settlement where the class members had rather
tenuous connections to the Netherlands (none of the defendants
and only a few plaintiffs were domiciled in the Netherlands),
the alleged wrongdoing took place outside the Netherlands, and
182
the claims were not brought under Dutch law. The court in
Converium suggested that without a single interested person
domiciled in the Netherlands, the court could have upheld jurisdiction in the Netherlands to declare the settlement bind183
ing. This case seems to indicate that the Amsterdam Court of
Appeal will broaden its jurisdictional reach to provide international investors with an attractive option for redress in class
184
action legal suits.
Similar to the Fortis case, Converium originated in 2004 in
185
the United States when Converium shareholders filed a secu181. See Weinberger, supra note 176.
182. See Hof ’s-Amsterdam 12 november 2010, JOR 2011, 46 m.nt. J.S.
Kortmann (Converium Foundation VEB/SCOR ZFS), ¶¶ 2.1, 2.3, 2.12 (Neth.),
translated
in
http://www.blbglaw.com/cases/00172_data/
Judgmentof12Novermber2010CourtofAppeal.pdf; Converium COA Decision,
supra note 32, ¶ 3.
183. Legal Alert Converium, supra note 34.
184. Press Release, Reuters, In Landmark Ruling, Dutch Court of Appeal
Approves Settlements in the Converium/SCOR Securities Action (Jan. 18,
2012), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/18/idUS223043+18
-Jan-2012+BW20120118; Mark Cobley, Dutch Ruling Could Pave Way for
Class Action Suits, FIN. NEWS (Jan. 25, 2012), http://www.efinancialnews
.com/story/2012-01-25/dutch-class-action-ruling-converium?mod=
sectionheadlines-PE-AM; Cohen Milstein Secures Landmark Ruling as Dutch
Court of Appeal Approves Settlements in the Converium/SCOR Securities Action, COHEN MILSTEIN (Jan. 18, 2012), http://www.cohenmilstein.com/
news.php?NewsID=487; LaCroix, supra note 22; Legal Alert, Converium:
Dutch Court Declares an International Collective Settlement Binding, DE
BRAUW BLACKSTONE WESTBROEK (Jan. 18, 2012), http://www.debrauw.com/
News/LegalAlerts/Pages/LitigationLegalAlert-18January2012-Converium
.aspx.
185. Converium Holding AG (Converium) is a Swiss reinsurance company
(currently known as SCOR Holding Company) that was a wholly owned subsidiary of Zürich Financial Services Ltd. (ZFS) until 2001, when ZFS sold its
Converium shares through an IPO. Reuters, supra note 184. Converium
shares were listed on the SWX Swiss Exchange and Converium American De-
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rities class action in the Southern District of New York. The
plaintiffs alleged that the price of Converium’s stock was artificially inflated during the class period because Converium had
misrepresented its financial condition and had concealed a
massive deficiency in its loss reserves for its North American
187
business. Converium disclosed the misrepresentation and the
188
deficiency in loss reserves in September 2004. The disclosure
resulted in adverse stock price reactions and losses to inves189
tors. The U.S. class action was settled and the settlements
190
were approved by the U.S. Court on December 12, 2008.
The U.S. Court had excluded the Non-U.S. Purchasers
from participation in the U.S. class action, so that they had no
191
effective course for validating their potential claims. NonU.S. Converium investors represented by the Stichting
Converium Securities Compensation Foundation (the Founda192
193
tion)
and Vereniging VEB NCVB (VEB),
petitioned the
Amsterdam Court of Appeal under the WCAM to approve sepa194
rate settlement agreements with Converium and ZFS. In an
interim decision, the Amsterdam Court of Appeal on November
12, 2010 recognized the Settlement Agreements between the
pository Shares (ADS) were listed on the New York Stock Exchange. Id.
186. Plaintiffs’ attorneys had filed a worldwide putative class action
against Converium and ZFS in the United States. In re SCOR Holding (Switzerland) AG Litigation, 537 F. Supp. 2d 556, 558 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), available at
http://www.blbglaw.com/cases/00019_data/2008.12.12
-ConveriumOrderFinalJudgment.pdf. The U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York (the U.S. Court) certified a class consisting of all U.S. citizens who had purchased Converium securities on any exchange as well as
persons, regardless of their residence, who had purchased Converium securities on a U.S. exchange (the U.S. Purchasers). Id. at 569–79, 583. The U.S.
Court excluded from the class all non-U.S. persons who had purchased
Converium securities on any non-U.S. exchange (the Non-U.S. Purchasers). Id.
at 569.
187. Converium COA Decision, supra note 32, ¶ 5.2.1.
188. In re SCOR Holding, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 565, 583.
189. Id. at 585.
190. See id. at 559.
191. Converium COA Decision, supra note 32, ¶¶ 6.4.1–2.
192. The Foundation represents the interests of Non-U.S. exchange purchasers. Id. ¶ 5.1.3. Materials from the Foundation available at http://www
.converiumsettlement.com/.
193. VEB represents the interests of Dutch exchange purchasers.
Converium COA Decision, supra note 32, ¶ 5.1.3.
194. Hof ’s-Amsterdam 12 november 2010, JOR 2011, 46 m.nt. J.S.
Kortmann (Converium Foundation VEB/SCOR ZFS), ¶¶ 2.1–3, 2.10. (Neth.),
translated
in
http://www.blbglaw.com/cases/00172_data/
Judgmentof12November2010CourtofAppeal.pdf.
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Foundation and VEB with SCOR Holding/Converium (First
Agreement) and ZFS (Second Agreement, together the Agree195
ments) pursuant to the WCAM.
The Amsterdam Court of Appeal declared the Settlement
196
Agreements binding on January 17, 2012. The court found
that in view of the extent of the loss, the ease and speed with
which the compensation could be obtained, and the possible
197
causes of the loss, the compensation awarded was reasonable.
The court argued that the sum awarded to the Non-U.S. Purchasers was proportionally lower than the settlement payment
($84,600,000) for the smaller group of U.S. Purchasers because

195. The Settlement Agreements provide for compensation to eligible NonU.S. Purchasers of Converium stock. Converium COA Decision, supra note 32,
¶¶ 5.1.1–3. Specifically, the Agreements aim to compensate Non-U.S. Purchasers who purchased Converium shares from January 7, 2002 to September
2, 2004 on a non-U.S. stock exchange, and who incurred a loss as a result of
the company’s (non)disclosures regarding its North American loss reserves. Id.
The total settlement payment (before deduction of costs and fees) is USD
40,000,000 under the First Agreement and USD 18,400,000 under the Second
Agreement. Id. ¶ 5.2.3. Both agreements contain elaborated settlement distribution plans for the distribution of the awards. See id. The settlement payment is in one or more segregated bank accounts administered by a civil law
notary. Id. ¶ 7. The distribution plan is set forth in Exhibit C to the Settlement Agreements. See Settlement Agreement Between the Foundation and
VEB and SCOR, BERNSTEIN LITOWITZ BERGER & GROSSMAN LLP (July 2,
2010), http://www.blbglaw.com/cases/00172_data/SettlementAgreementwithSCOR
.pdf; Settlement Agreement Between the Foundation and VEB and ZFS,
BERNSTEIN LITOWITZ BERGER & GROSSMAN LLP (July 2, 2010), http://www
.blbglaw.com/cases/00172_data/SettlementAgreementwithZFS.pdf.
196. Converium COA Decision, supra note 32, ¶ 4.1. The Court stated that
the Agreements satisfy the requirements of article 1013(1) and (2) of the
Dutch Code of Civil Procedure regarding the announcement of the hearing and
notification of interested parties. Id. ¶ 4.1; see Rv art. 1013(1), (2) (Neth.),
translated in Code of Civil Procedure, BRECHT, http://www.dutchcivillaw
.com/legislation/civilprocedure033.htm#1013. Interested parties were notified
by writ, registered letter, or ordinary letter. Converium COA Decision, supra
note 32, ¶ 4.2.2. In addition, the hearing was announced in newspapers in
Germany, France, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom,
and Switzerland in the Wall Street Journal Europe and the Economist, and on
the websites www.converiumsettlement.com, www.blbglaw.com, www.srkw
-law.com, www.cohenmilstein.com, and www.VEB.net. Converium COA Decision, supra note 32, ¶¶ 4.2.3–4. They also satisfy the requirements of articles
7:907(3) and 7:908(2). Id. ¶ 5.1.4; see BW art. 7:907(3), 908(2) (Neth.), translated in Code of Civil Procedure, BRECHT, http://www.dutchcivillaw.com/
legislation/dcctitle771515.htm (regarding reasonableness of the compensation
awarded, representativeness of the foundation, and the availability of opt-out
statements). The decision was rendered by Justices W.J.J. Los, A.H.A.
Scholten, and J.W. Rutgers. Converium COA Decision, supra note 32.
197. Converium COA Decision, supra note 32, ¶ 6.

2012]

COMPETITION IN SECURITIES LAW

179

the legal position of the Non-U.S. Purchasers differed substan198
tially from the legal position of the U.S. Purchasers.
Importantly, the court held that the amount of fees and
199
expenses awarded to Principal Counsel (twenty percent of the
200
settlement payment) was not excessive and was compatible
with Dutch standards. Principal Counsel’s work was performed
to a large extent within the American system and by U.S. law
firms. The U.S. court awarded a similar fee in its 2008 decision,
201
suggesting that the fee was customary and reasonable. Empirical studies on the level of fees in comparable situations in202
dicate that a twenty percent fee is customary. Finally, comparing the contingent fee with an hourly fee (lodestar
calculation) indicates that the two fees do not differ significant203
ly.
The court found that it was sufficient for petitioners to be
jointly represented, thus, affirming the standing of foundations
204
under Dutch law. The court also found that Non-U.S. Purchasers who wanted to bring an individual claim to court had
the option of opting out of the binding nature of the agreements
205
by issuing an opt-out statement.
198. Id. ¶ 6.4.1.
199. Principal Counsel is a collaboration of three U.S. law firms (Bernstein
Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP, Cohen Milstein Hausfeld & Toll, PLLC
and Spector Roseman & Kodroff, PC). Id. ¶ 6.5.3.
200. Id. ¶ 6.5.1.
201. Id. ¶¶ 6.5.2–6.5.4; DE BRAUW BLACKSTONE WESTBROEK, supra note
184.
202. Converium COA Decision, supra note 32, ¶ 6.5.5.
203. Id. ¶ 6.5.6.
204. Id. ¶¶ 10.1–.2. The court held that VEB was sufficiently representative with respect to the interests of the Dutch exchange purchasers. Id. ¶ 10.3.
The Foundation was incorporated to represent the interests of non-U.S. Purchasers and has the support of twenty-nine foreign organizations, including
European representative organizations and various representative organizations and institutional investors from Switzerland and the United Kingdom
(the countries where most of the known Non-U.S. Purchasers are domiciled).
Id. ¶ 10.4.
205. Id. ¶ 6.4.3. The Court believes that in view of the time, costs, and risks
associated with conducting individual litigation, most Non-U.S. Purchasers
are unlikely to bring their own litigation and therefore would not receive any
compensation at all if the Agreements were not declared binding. The court
stated that a person entitled to compensation could, within a period of three
months following the announcement of the court decision, inform the appropriate authority in writing or by e-mail of his or her wish not to be bound. Id.
¶¶ 14.1–.2, .4. For the person entitled to compensation who could not be cognizant of his loss at the time of the announcement of the court decision, the time
period for submitting an opt-out statement is six months after the entitled
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The Converium decision adds several features to those established by the Fortis decision. Jointly, these decisions could
make the Dutch system even more attractive to investors who,
before Morrison, would have considered bringing a claim in the
United States. The application of Dutch civil law in the Fortis
case suggests that the Dutch legal system can match legal protections available in the United States under Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5.
By allowing U.S.-style fee arrangements, the Converium
decision adds an important incentive for plaintiffs’ attorneys to
bring claims in the Netherlands. While awarding twenty per206
cent of the settlement to lead counsel is not quite at the level
207
of some fee arrangements in the United States, twenty percent should suffice to attract plaintiffs’ attorneys’ interest, especially in light of the cases that will no longer be brought in
the United States because of the restrictions imposed by Morrison. While the court’s decision that a twenty percent fee is
208
compatible with Dutch standards could make the Dutch legal
system more attractive to plaintiffs’ attorneys, the lead counsel’s work in the Converium case was performed to a large extent within the American legal system and by U.S. law firms. It
remains to be seen whether a case that is litigated in Dutch
courts without exposure to the U.S. legal system will yield a
comparable fee structure.
Another attractive feature of the Dutch legal system that
could make it a favorite choice for plaintiffs’ attorneys is that
decisions by Dutch courts under WCAM have to be recognized,
at least in principle, in all European Member States, Switzerland, Iceland, and Norway under the Brussels I Regulation and
209
the Lugano Convention.
The likely recognition of Shell,
210
Ahold, Fortis, and Converium by other European Courts
could make the Dutch WCAM a valuable alternative for U.S.
person has been informed in writing that he is eligible for compensation and
may opt out of the binding declaration. Id. ¶ 14.3.
206. Converium COA Decision, supra note 32, ¶ 6.5.1.
207. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses in Class Action Settlements: 1993–2008, 11–12 (N.Y. Univ. Ctr. for Law,
Econ., and Org., Working Paper No. 09-50, 2009), available at http://papers
.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1497224.
208. Converium COA Decision, supra note 32, ¶ 6.5.1.
209. Legal Alert Converium, supra note 34.
210. Under the Brussels I Regulation, a Dutch collective settlement declared binding under the WCAM is binding for all other EU Member States.
The same applies to Switzerland, Iceland, and Norway under the Lugano Convention. See id.
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class action settlements, which are less likely to be recognized
by courts in European countries.
The Netherlands is already Europe’s most attractive venue
to facilitate such settlements because it is the only European
country that allows a collective settlement in a mass litigation
to be binding on all class members who do not opt-out of the
211
class. Given the developments in the Fortis and Converium
decisions, it is conceivable that Dutch courts could expand their
exterritorial reach beyond settlements. The literature contrasting Shell and its progeny with Morrison suggests the in212
creasing prominence of Dutch courts after Morrison. There is
even some evidence that the Converium court knew the implications of its judgment and was purposefully creating an alternative European venue for international collective settlements
213
in mass claims. The court’s decision has some references to
the limitations of U.S. courts in securities and anti-trust cases
214
as a result of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison.
3. Fraud-on-the-Market
In the United States, plaintiffs in securities class actions
are not required to prove reliance on defendants’ alleged misstatements or omissions. Under the fraud-on-the-market theory, plaintiffs in U.S. courts merely have to show that they relied on the integrity of the stock price when they purchased
215
their stock. By contrast, private plaintiffs suing in European
courts to recover damages for securities law violations are required in most European countries to establish individualized
216
reliance.
211. See sources cited supra note 149.
212. Polak & Hermans, supra note 114, at 6 (“[N]ow that ‘foreign cubed
class actions’ have been made impossible in the United States . . . the Netherlands may be the place to certify a class action settlement involving non-US
investors in non-US securities listed on a non-US stock exchange.”).
213. Legal Alert Converium, supra note 34 (“It should be noted that the
Court is fully aware of the significance of its judgment in creating an alternative venue to declare international collective settlements in mass claims binding on all class members. The Court explicitly referred to the limitations for
the U.S. courts to do so in securities and anti-trust cases as a result of the U.S.
Supreme Court’s decisions in Morrison v. National Australia Bank and Hoffman-La Roche v. Empagran.”).
214. Id.
215. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241–42 (1988).
216. See, e.g., Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters]
com., Nov. 22, 2005, Bull. civ. IV, No. 03-20600 (Fr.) (holding that under
French law individual plaintiffs are required to prove actual reliance);
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Unlike other European countries, the Dutch Supreme
Court in its World Online decision established a presumption of
217
reliance/causation for cases involving prospectus liability.
The court recognized that investors are guided by a multitude
of considerations in making an investment decision. Proving reliance and causation leading to an investment decision because
of a misleading statement in a prospectus could be near impos218
sible. Given the problems with causality and reliance, and
219
recognizing that the Prospectus Directive envisions investor
220
protection as one of its core objectives, the court established a
presumption of a causal connection between the misleading
221
statement in the prospectus and the investment decision. Accordingly, under the holding in World Online, plaintiffs do not

Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Nov. 28, 2005, II ZR 80/04
(Ger.) (rejecting Basic Inc. v. Levinson’s fraud-on-the-market theory); Theodor
Baums & Kenneth E. Scott, Taking Shareholder Protection Seriously? Corporate Governance in the United States and Germany, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 31, 71
(2005) (contrasting the U.S. fraud-on-the-market theory with the German requirement of actual reliance); Hubert de Vauplane & Odile Simart, The Concept of Securities Manipulation and Its Foundations in France and the USA,
23 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 203, 205 (1997) (noting that France has not adopted the
fraud-on-the-market theory); Eilís Ferran, Are US-Style Investor Suits Coming
to the UK?, 9 J. CORP. L. STUD. 315, 327, 336 (2009) (noting that the fraud-onthe-market theory has not yet been adopted in the United Kingdom or Australia).
217. HR 27 november 2009, JOR 2010, 43 m.nt. K. Frielink (VEB
e.a./World Online e.a.) (Neth.), available at http://zoeken.rechtspraak.nl/
detailpage.aspx?ljn=BH2162; see also de Jong, supra note 25, at 364 –65 (discussing the World Online decision and its implications); Thompson, supra note
25, at 1138–40 (explaining the differences of the Dutch and U.S. systems of
securities litigation and underscoring the attractiveness of the Dutch rules).
Similarly, after a class action regime was introduced in Italy, the Italian Supreme Court adopted something comparable to the U.S. fraud-on-the-market
theory, introducing a presumption of reliance and, thus, allowing investors to
bring a claim based on a misleading statement in a prospectus or official company announcement without having read the respective document. See ALLEN
& OVERY, supra note 22.
218. See de Jong, supra note 25, at 356.
219. Directive 2010/73, of the European Parliament and of the Council of
24 November 2010 Amending Directives 2003/71/EC on the Prospectus to Be
Published When Securities Are Offered to the Public or Admitted to Trading
and 2004/109/EC on the Harmonisation of Transparency Requirements in Relation to Information About Issuers Whose Securities Are Admitted to Trading
on a Regulated Market, 2010 O.J. (L 327) 1, available at http://eur-lex
.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2010:327:0001:0012:EN:PDF.
220. See id. at Preamble ¶ 3.
221. de Jong, supra note 25, at 364.
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have to show actual reliance on a fraudulent statement in pro222
spectus liability cases.
Dutch courts could extend the theory of the Dutch Supreme Court, establishing a presumption of reliance in prospectus liability cases, to other areas of the law. The “line of reasoning of the court extends quite naturally to claims dealing with
the violation of ad hoc disclosure obligations and misleading
223
periodic reports.” These developments suggest that the Dutch
legal system could effectively compete with the United States,
at least as it pertains to lowering the crucial threshold requirement of reliance in securities actions. Lower substantive
and procedural requirements for securities actions in the Netherlands could attract plaintiffs that would have brought a foreign-cubed securities action in the United States before Morrison and perhaps even some plaintiffs who still can sue in the
United States.
4. Countervailing Factors
The Dutch WCAM includes an opt-out procedure similar to
224
the securities class action rules in the United States. As explained above, the Netherlands may also relax the reliance requirement in some cases. Other factors, however, could weigh
against the Dutch legal system in attracting international
plaintiffs, particularly those from the United States. The Dutch
legal system also has not played a significant role in attracting
225
lawsuits in the past.
English being the official language of a court system plays
226
an important role in litigants’ selection criteria. Dutch courts
hear cases in Dutch, although this could change in the future if
222. Id.
223. Id. at 375.
224. DE BRAUW BLACKSTONE WESTBROEK, supra note 142. The Netherlands is one of only four countries that allow the opt-out procedure to be used.
Other countries are the United States, Canada, and South Korea. See Hannah
L. Buxbaum, Multinational Class Actions Under Federal Securities Law:
Managing Jurisdictional Conflict, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 14, 61 (2007)
(“[T]he United States is unusual in recognizing presumed reliance based on
the fraud on the market theory, rather than requiring investors to prove actual reliance on misleading information.”); Luke Green, Multi-National Securities Class Actions Go Global, INST. S’HOLDER SERVS., INC. BLOG (Jan. 26, 2011,
6:26 PM), http://blog.issgovernance.com/slw/2011/01/multi-national-securities
-class-action-go-international.html.
225. See Thompson, supra note 25, at 1141.
226. See Kirchner, Painter & Kaal, supra note 15, at 176–77 (explaining
the importance of the English language in the competition of legal systems).
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lawyers are given an option to plead and argue in English.
The attorney compensation framework in the Netherlands
could also be detrimental to the development of a competitive
regulatory framework. Although cases such as Converium with
large exposure to the U.S. legal system have resulted in attor228
ney fees of up to twenty percent of the settlement payment,
the lack of contingent-fee arrangements generally and the loser-pays rule in the Netherlands may not provide sufficient incentives for plaintiffs’ attorneys to pursue legal claims in the
229
Netherlands. Other crucial differences between the class action systems of the United States and the Netherlands include
differences in plaintiff representation. The WCAM in the Netherlands requires a court-approved foundation to pursue the se230
curities class action on behalf of investors. This WCAM requirement makes the Dutch regime somewhat more
burdensome than the United States’ system, which simply requires a lead plaintiff and class approval.
Under the WCAM, only court-authorized representatives,
such as the aforementioned foundation, can pursue claims on
231
behalf of investors. Because Dutch courts in WCAM proceed227. In Germany, North Rhine-Westphalia and Hamburg introduced the
English language in court proceedings. See Michael Karger, NRW und Hamburg: die Gerichtssprache ist: . . . auch Englisch, BECK-BLOG, http://blog.beck
.de/2010/01/15/nrw-und-hamburg-die-gerichtssprache-ist-auch-englisch. The
reform of German procedural law to establish English in German courtrooms
arguably would benefit German attorneys. See Im Namen der Globalisierung,
ZEIT ONLINE (May 23, 2010, 2:49 PM), http://www.zeit.de/2010/21/Justiz
-Prozesse-Englisch.
228. Converium COA Decision, supra note 32, ¶ 6.5.1 (holding that a twenty percent attorney fee was compatible with Dutch legal standards).
229. On the other hand, legal practices focusing exclusively on class actions
in Europe seem to indicate that the monetary incentives could be sufficient.
See supra note 119 and accompanying text; John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation Governance: Taking Accountability Seriously, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 288, 292 (2010)
(discussing the respective attorney compensation schemes in the United
States and Europe); Samuel Issacharoff & Geoffrey P. Miller, Will Aggregate
Litigation Come to Europe?, 62 VAND. L. REV. 179, 180–81 (2009); see also
Samuel P. Baumgartner, Class Actions and Group Litigation in Switzerland,
27 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 301, 303 (2007); Mark A. Behrens et al., Global Litigation Trends, 16 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 165, 183 (2009); Richard Cappalli, The
Style and Substance of Civil Procedure Reform: Comparison of the United
States and Italy, 16 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 861, 869 (1994); Harald
Koch, Non-Class Group Litigation Under EU and German Law, 11 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT’L L. 355, 365 (2001); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of
Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical Overview, 1982 DUKE L.J. 651, 653–54 (discussing the loser pays practices in European legal systems).
230. See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing the features of the WCAM).
231. BW art. 3:305a (Neth.), translated in Dutch Civil Code, BRECHT,
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ings are limited to certifying the class and approving out-of232
court settlements,
court-authorized representatives cannot
233
seek damages. Instead, under the WCAM an agreement between the alleged wrongdoer and the foundation, representing
the interests of the injured class, determines the compensation
234
for the class. After class members have the opportunity to reject the agreement, the Amsterdam Court of Appeal has the
235
discretion to declare the agreement binding. Although the
judgment of the Dutch court is in principle enforceable in
courts outside the Netherlands, it remains to be seen whether
or not courts in other jurisdictions will, in fact, recognize the
judgment. There are also different discovery practices in the
236
United States than in the Netherlands and different settle237
ment mechanisms.
Given these limitations, the WCAM system could limit the
number of successful settlements. While the largest cases, such
as Shell and Fortis, would probably still provide sufficient leverage for the plaintiffs to result in large settlements with defendants, smaller cases may not be successfully settled in
Dutch courts. Lawyers who have the option to sue in the United States after Morrison may prefer to do so.

http://www.dutchcivillaw.com/civilcodebook033.htm; VAN LITH, supra note
112, at 16; Hermans & de Bie Leuveling Tjeenk, supra note 112, ¶ 6; Tzankova
& Scheuerleer, supra note 127, at 152; van Boom, supra note 119, at 10; Briefing Note, Overview of Existing Collective Redress Schemes in EU Member
States, DIRECTORATE GEN. FOR INTERNAL POLICIES POLICY DEP’T A: ECON. &
SCIENTIFIC POLICY, § 2.11, IP/A/IMCO/NT/2011-16 (July 2011), available at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201107/
20110715ATT24242/20110715ATT24242EN.pdf; EUR. COMM’N, supra note
149, at 4.
232. van Boom, supra note 119, at 858 n.3; DIRECTORATE GEN. FOR INTERNAL POLICIES POLICY DEP’T A: ECON. AND SCIENTIFIC POLICY, supra note 231,
§ 2.11; EUR. COMM’N, supra note 149, at 6.
233. van Boom, supra note 119, at 864; EUROPEAN COMM’N, supra note
149, at 4.
234. See Hirst, supra note 149.
235. Id.
236. Plaintiffs can usually obtain broad discovery in the United States although only after a motion to dismiss has been decided in their favor. Scott
Dodson, New Pleading, New Discovery, 109 MICH. L. REV. 53, 67 (2010); see van
Boom, supra note 119, at 10.
237. See van Boom, supra note 119, at 10.

186

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[97:132

C. CANADA AS A FORUM FOR MULTI-NATIONAL SECURITIES
CLASS ACTIONS
Because there is already extensive English language commentary on securities litigation in Canada, this Article will not
explore securities litigation in Canada in as much detail as recent developments in the Netherlands. Nonetheless, because
most Canadian courts use the English language, and because of
Canada’s geographic proximity to the United States, Canada is
a natural venue for securities litigation that can no longer be
conducted in the United States after Morrison. European jurisdictions that provide a forum for global securities litigation will
likely engage in Forum Competition with Canada. Plaintiffs’
lawyers will urge European jurisdictions to mimic pro-plaintiff
developments in Canada and vice versa. Defendants, on the
other hand, will look to both Europe and Canada for restraint,
perhaps similar to that imposed by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Morrison.
U.S. courts applying Morrison have thus far refused to apply U.S. securities laws to transactions taking place in Canada,
even if the same securities are also listed for trading in the
238
United States. Canada thus has an opportunity to engage in
Forum Competition with the United States if its courts assume
a different posture and allow suits under Canadian law with
respect to all transactions in securities listed for trading in
Canada, even if some of those transactions take place in the
United States. A single class of Canadian and U.S. investors
that cannot be assembled in the United States after Morrison
could, in this scenario, be assembled in Canada. It remains to
be seen, however, what Canada will do to accommodate extraterritorial securities litigation of this or any other sort.
For plaintiffs and their lawyers, however, Canada is already an attractive alternative to the United States when it
239
comes to filing securities class action lawsuits. Several factors, including recent Supreme Court decisions in Wal-Mart
240
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes and AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concep-

238. See In re Vivendi Universal Sec. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 512, 531
(S.D.N.Y. 2010).
239. Ashby Jones, Lawyers Looking to Canada for Shareholder Litigation,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 2012, at B4.
240. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
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241

cion, suggest a judicial hostility to class action litigation in
the United States that may not be present in Canada. Since the
U.S. Supreme Court handed down the Morrison decision on
June 24, 2010, securities class action suits appear to have
242
gained traction in Canada. Although there is some evidence
that class actions were already on the rise in Canada prior to
243
the Morrison decision, in 2011 alone, fifteen new class actions
were filed in Canada, increasing the number of active class ac244
tions from thirty to forty-five as of December 31, 2011. Nine
of the fifteen cases filed in 2011 were filed under the continuous disclosure provisions of Part XXIII.1 of the Ontario Securi245
ties Act (OSA), enacted in 2005.
241. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011); see also Coffee, supra note 20, at 14 (discussing
the impact of these and other Supreme Court decisions on class actions in the
United States).
242. Jones, supra note 239, at B4; LaCroix, supra note 85.
243. Mark L. Berenblut et al., Trends in Canadian Securities Class Actions:
1997–2008, NERA (Jan. 2009), https://www.complianceweek.com/s/documents/
PUBTrendsCanada.pdf. According to the NERA report, a spike in class actions
took place in 2008. Id. at 2, 4. Claims focused mainly on improper accounting,
misleading earnings guidance, insider trading, product/operational defects,
and customer/vendor issues. Id. at 6. This upsurge was due in part to the effects of the credit crisis on Canadian financial markets. Id. at 6.
244. Heys & Berenblut, supra note 180, at 1.
245. Id. Bill 198 cases refer to cases brought under the continuous disclosure provisions of Part XXIII.1 of the Ontario Securities Act enacted in 2005 or
analogous provisions of other provincial securities acts. See Ontario Securities
Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5 (Can.), available at http://www.e-laws.gov.on.ca/html/
statutes/english/elaws_statutes_90s05_e.htm#BK247 (providing a statutory
cause of action for secondary market misrepresentation); see also Keeping the
Promise for a Strong Economy Act (Budget Measures) ONT. SEC. COMM’N
(2002),
http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Securities/ar_20021112_bill
-198.pdf. These new class actions are estimated to represent approximately
CAD $24.5 billion in claims. Heys & Berenblut, supra note 180, at 1. Bill 198
claims were filed against the following issuers in 2011: Alange Energy, Armtec
Infrastructure Inc., BCE Inc., Canada Lithium Corporation, Cathay Forest
Products, Eastern Platinum Limited, North American Palladium, Sino-Forest
Corporation, Zungui Haixi Corporation. Id. at 4. The plaintiffs in two of the
Bill 198 cases—IMAX and Arctic Glacier—were granted leave to proceed with
their claims and the cases were certified as class actions. Id. at 12; see Kevin
LaCroix, In Landmark Rulings, Ontario Court Allows IMAX Securities Suit to
Proceed, Certifies Class, D & O DIARY (Dec. 15, 2009), http://www.dandodiary
.com/2009/12/articles/securities-litigation/in-landmark-rulings-ontario-court
-allows-imax-securities-suit-to-proceed-certifies-class/; Kevin LaCroix, Leave to
Proceed, Class Certification Given in Another Ontario Securities Suit, D & O
DIARY
(Mar.
9,
2011),
http://www.dandodiary.com/2011/03/articles/
international-d-o/leave-to-proceed-class-certification-given-in-another-ontario
-securities-suit/; see also Dobbie v. Arctic Glacier Income Fund 2011 ONSC 25
(Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.), available at http://www.canlii.org/en/on/onsc/doc/
2011/2011onsc25/2011onsc25.html (certifying class action for secondary mar-
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There is some evidence that securities class action filings
246
in Canada will continue to proliferate. Several factors may
contribute to a continuing increase in Canadian class action filings in 2012 and beyond: (1) the impact of Morrison on claims
in U.S. courts for non-U.S. investors in non-U.S. stocks (which
makes Canada a more attractive venue for these cases), (2) the
growth in the Canadian class action bar in terms of both firms
and lawyers bringing and defending the cases, (3) Canadian
rulings granting certification of global classes and giving plaintiffs leave to proceed, and (4) the success of class counsel in
reaching multi-million dollar settlements in Canada (and class247
counsel fee awards).
The growth in the Canadian class action bar suggests that
plaintiffs’ attorneys view Canadian courts as an increasingly
248
attractive venue for investors to pursue their claims. Recent249
ly, plaintiffs in Abdula v. Canadian Solar Inc. chose to file in
Canada even though the shares were listed on the NASDAQ in
250
the United States. On March 30, 2012, the Ontario Court of
Appeals held that “[e]xtra-territorial application is specifically
envisaged by . . . the definition of ‘responsible issuer,’ with its
reference to issuers with a ‘real and substantial connection’ to
251
Ontario.” As a result, Ontario class action filings against for252
eign issuers could increase dramatically.

ket misrepresentations); Silver v. IMAX Corp. (2008), 167 A.C.W.S. (3d) 881
(Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.), available at http://www.canlii.org/en/on/onsc/doc/2008/
2008canlii21905/2008canlii21905.html (granting leave to proceed with first
claim under OSA). The other cases include a shareholder class action involving prospectus claims, a claim related to a takeover bid, two actions related to
the management of investment funds, and two allegations of a Ponzi scheme.
Heys & Berenblut, supra note 180, at 4.
246. Id. at 13.
247. Id. at 1.
248. LaCroix, supra note 85; see Rubin, supra note 85 (discussing U.S. class
action attorney relocating to Canada).
249. 2011 ONSC 5105 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.), available at http://www
.canlii.org/en/on/onsc/doc/2011/2011onsc5105/2011onsc5105.html, aff’d, 2012
ONCA 211 (Can. Ont. Ct. App.).
250. Heys & Berenblut, supra note 180, at 5; see also Brandon Kain, OCA
to Address Secondary Market Claims Against Foreign-Listed Issuers, CAN. APPEALS MONITOR (Jan. 20, 2012), http://www.canadianappeals.com/2012/01/20/
oca-to-address-secondary-market-claims-against-foreign-listed-issuers/
(discussing the potential impact of the Court of Appeals’ ruling).
251. Canadian Solar, 2012 ONCA 211, at para. 88, available at http://www
.ontariocourts.ca/decisions/2012/2012ONCA0211.htm.
252. Kain, supra note 250.

2012]

COMPETITION IN SECURITIES LAW

189
253

The plaintiff in Canadian Solar, an Ontario investor,
commenced an action against the defendant issuer and two of
its officers and directors, seeking damages for misrepresentation, leave to commence an action for secondary market mis254
representations under section 138.3 of the OSA, and an oppression remedy pursuant to the Canada Business
255
Corporations Act.
The court denied defendant’s motion to
256
dismiss finding that Canadian Solar fell under the definition
257
of “responsible issuer” in section 138.1 of the OSA and had a
258
“real and substantial connection to Ontario” because: (1) it
was incorporated in Canada, (2) it had an executive office in
Ontario, (3) it carried on business and held its annual meeting
in Ontario, and (4) the alleged misrepresentations were con-

253. The plaintiff resides in Markham, Ontario. 2011 ONSC 5015 at para.
4. The plaintiff purchased a total of 2,000 shares of Canadian Solar between
January 21 and May 4, 2010. Id. at para. 5.
254. Ontario Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5 (Can.), available at
http://www.elaws.gov.on.ca/html/statutes/english/elaws_statutes_90s05_e
.htm#BK262.
255. Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44, available at
http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/PDF/C-44.pdf; Canadian Solar, 2011 ONSC 5105,
at para. 1.
256. Canadian Solar, 2011 ONSC 5105, at para. 1. The defendants moved
to dismiss the case arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction because: (1) Canadian Solar’s shares traded exclusively on the NASDAQ, (2) Canadian Solar
was governed by the federal CBCA rather than Ontario corporations law, (3)
Canadian Solar’s principal place of business was in China, (4) the majority of
Canadian Solar’s manufacturing operations occurred in China, (5) the majority of Canadian Solar’s senior executives resided in China, including the two
director/officer defendants, (6) the press releases were filed with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, (7) the press releases were followed by conference calls in which the director/officer defendants participated
from China, (8) the annual report was filed with the SEC, and (9) the prospectus supplement was filed with the SEC. See Kain, supra note 250.
257. Canadian Solar, 2011 ONSC 5105 at para. 46; see also Ontario Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5 (Can.), available at http://www.e-laws.gov.on.ca/
html/statutes/english/elaws_statutes_90s05_e.htm#BK262 (“Where a responsible issuer or a person or company with actual, implied or apparent authority
to act on behalf of a responsible issuer releases a document that contains a
misrepresentation, a person or company who acquires or disposes of the issuer’s security during the period between the time when the document was released and the time when the misrepresentation contained in the document
was publicly corrected has, without regard to whether the person or company
relied on the misrepresentation, a right of action for damages against, (a) the
responsible issuer; (b) each director of the responsible issuer . . . ; (c) each officer of the responsible issuer who authorized, permitted, or acquiesced in the
release of the document . . . .”).
258. Canadian Solar, 2011 ONCA 5105 at para. 46.
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tained in press releases and other documents such as financial
259
statements that were released or presented in Ontario.
Some Canadian jurisdictions have recently eliminated the
260
reliance requirement for securities-fraud actions, another factor that could encourage plaintiffs to file securities class actions
in Canadian courts rather than in courts in the United
261
States. Class certification requirements and contingent-fee
arrangements in the United States and Canada are relatively
similar, which could also attract plaintiffs familiar with the
262
U.S. system.
Despite these similarities, the certification of global classes
263
raises conflict-of-laws issues that could be an obstacle. Courts
may have to specify under what circumstances an Ontario
court can assume jurisdiction over foreign class members. Sil264
ver v. IMAX Corp. raises many choice of law concerns. As
Tanya Monestier notes: “What law governs the statutory claims
of claimants who purchase and sell securities on a foreign exchange? Would a Canadian court apply foreign securities law in
265
a domestic proceeding . . . ?”
In IMAX, plaintiffs sought leave to commence a proceeding
under section 138.3 of Part XXIII.1 of the OSA and certification
266
as a class action. IMAX was a Canadian company headquartered in Ontario, plaintiffs were Ontario residents, and IMAX
267
shares were traded on both the TSX and NASDAQ. Plaintiffs
claimed that several of IMAX’s financial filings and press releases contained misrepresentations that caused the value of
268
their shares to decline. Plaintiffs asserted common law misrepresentation and statutory misrepresentation under the

259. Id.
260. Knutsen, supra note 25, at 157; Pritchard & Sarra, supra note 25, at
892.
261. Noam Noked, A New Playbook for Global Securities Litigation and
Regulation, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Feb. 2,
2012,
9:53
AM),
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2012/02/02/a-new
-playbook-for-global-securities-litigation-and-regulation/.
262. Id.
263. Monestier, supra note 85, at 16.
264. Silver v. IMAX Corp. (2009), 86 C.P.C. (6th) 273 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct.
J.), available at http://www.canlii.org/en/on/onsc/doc/2009/2009canlii72334/
2009canlii72334.html.
265. Monestier, supra note 85, at 53.
266. IMAX, 86 C.P.C. (6th) 273 at paras. 5–6.
267. Id. at paras. 1, 4.
268. Id. at paras. 1, 2.
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OSA. The court certified both the statutory and common law
causes of action “despite the fact that [the plaintiffs] had not
pleaded individual reliance on the defendant’s misstate270
ments.” The court in IMAX thus seems to have lowered the
threshold for class certification in Canadian common law mis271
representation cases in securities class actions.
The still unresolved issue—and indeed the critical issue for
Forum Competition—is the extent to which Canada will allow
suits to be brought in its courts over transactions taking place
outside Canada. Will Canada apply a transactional test similar
to Morrison, or will Canada apply a more expansive test, perhaps similar to the conduct and effects tests previously used in
the United States, that would allow at least some U.S. securities transactions, and also, perhaps, transactions taking place
in other countries, to be subject to litigation in Canada? If Canada chooses to allow these suits, will its courts apply Canadian
law or the law of the country where the transaction took place?
Will Canada apply its own law to all transactions in securities
listed for trading in Canada (even if they are also listed for
trading in New York), regardless of where the plaintiffs’ transactions took place? Canada has an opportunity to engage in
vigorous Forum Competition with the United States and, perhaps, with Europe and other jurisdictions, to the benefit of
plaintiffs and their Canadian lawyers, but it remains to be seen
whether Canada will choose to do so.
Clearly some securities litigation will migrate from the
United States to Canada after Morrison, such as litigation involving securities transactions taking place in Canada. The unresolved question is whether Canada will also provide a forum
for litigation over other securities transactions that took place
in the United States, in Europe, or somewhere else outside of
Canada.

269. Id. at paras. 4, 5.
270. Monestier, supra note 85, at 8; see also IMAX, 86 C.P.C. (6th) 273 at
para. 190.
271. IMAX, 86 C.P.C. (6th) 273 at paras. 25, 56–75 (“For the purpose of certification, the question is whether the Claim discloses a cause of action in negligent misrepresentation. I have concluded that it does disclose such a cause of
action, notwithstanding the absence of a pleading of direct individual reliance
by each class member. In the event that the plaintiffs are unable to prove reliance, it will remain open for them to argue at trial that reliance is not required.”); see also Monestier, supra note 85, at 8 (discussing the low parameters set by IMAX).
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III. CHOICE OF LAW COMPETITION AFTER MORRISON
The Supreme Court’s holding in Morrison is likely to have
a profound impact on Choice of Law Competition, although in a
very different way than its impact on Forum Competition.
Whether or not the Court intended such a result, the Morrison
holding will give at least some transacting parties considerable
latitude to decide what law applies to their transactions.
The transactional test in Morrison could be relatively short
lived because it is rooted in geography and an increasing number of securities transactions defy geographical boundaries.
While the transactional test provides more predictability than
the conduct and effects tests that preceded it, there is ample
room for ambiguity, particularly for transactions that do not
take place on organized exchanges. Even transactions that do
take place on organized exchanges may be difficult to define geographically if the exchanges themselves cross geographical
boundaries.
Redirecting the focal point of securities regulation from the
geographic location of securities transactions toward the choice
of law by buyers and sellers of securities—or the choice of law
of the exchanges where securities are listed—could prove more
effective than trying to impose a single body of law on securities transactions within a certain geographic area, at least in
cases where the geographic location of a transaction and the
applicable law are uncertain.
A. CHALLENGES FOR A TRANSACTION TEST ROOTED IN
GEOGRAPHY
Erin O’Hara and Larry Ribstein devote much of their book
on jurisdictional competition to Choice of Law Competition that
is decoupled from the geographic location of parties or transac272
tions. Transacting parties, regardless of where they are located, choose the law they want to apply, and jurisdictions compete to induce transacting parties to choose their law. Nobody
has to move anywhere to affect a choice of law.
In the post-Morrison regime, however, the geographic location of the transaction determines whether U.S. law applies.
The contract between the buyer and seller will determine
choice of law only if the contract removes the securities transaction from the geographic boundaries of the United States.
This transactional test severely limits Choice of Law Competi272. O’HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 15.
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tion by tying parties to U.S. transactions to U.S. law; any
transaction within the territorial boundaries of the United
States is subject to U.S. law.
The geographic location of a transaction, however, is in
some instances difficult to identify. It is also in some instances
relatively easy to manipulate. For organized exchanges, the location is usually easy to determine if there is only one location
for the exchange, but it may not be easy to determine if the exchange has branches in more than one country and trades are
executed electronically rather than on an exchange floor. Exchanges will probably specify rules stating what transactions
on an exchange take place in the United States and what
transactions do not. The SEC must approve the rules of U.S.
exchanges, but foreign exchanges are subject to supervision by
foreign regulators. Exchanges that operate in both the United
States and in other countries will need to implement rules
identifying the transaction location that are acceptable to regulators and courts in all relevant jurisdictions.
There is some controversy over securities that are listed in
the United States but also traded somewhere else. The Court in
Morrison states in two places in its opinion that Section 10(b)
273
applies if a security is “listed” in the United States. This distinction is relevant for “dual listed” securities, for example,
those that are listed and traded in New York and Toronto. The
Court probably did not mean that Section 10(b) applies to the
trades in Toronto as well as the trades in New York, but, arguably, this is literally what the Court said in these passages in
Morrison. The better argument—so far endorsed by the district
courts in the Southern District of New York—is that applying
Section 10(b) to the Canadian transactions would be contrary to
the transaction test that is emphasized throughout the Morri274
son opinion.
Indeed, National Australia Bank itself had
American Depository Receipts (ADRs) listed for trading in New
York, and yet the Court refused to allow a private right of action for purchasers of its stock in Australia that was the func275
tional equivalent of these ADRs. However, some commentators argue that this issue is not so clear cut, and there are

273. Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2884 (2010).
274. See Painter et al., supra note 59, at 8–9 (discussing In re Vivendi Universal Sec. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)).
275. See id. at 2.
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policy arguments for applying Section 10(b) to Canadian trans276
actions if the securities are listed in the United States.
Transactions off of organized exchanges are even more
complicated. Private transactions in securities can be difficult
277
to locate. It is often unclear if the physical location of one or
both parties or their agents is an important factor, or whether
the place where the transaction clears—where title to securities
is transferred or where the money or other consideration
changes hands—matters more. Another test, embraced by the
Second Circuit in Absolute Activist Value Master Fund v.
278
Ficeto,
is that the transaction takes place in the United
States for purposes of Morrison if either the title to the securities is transferred in the United States or the parties incur irrevocable liability to purchase or deliver the securities in the
United States. This test may provide a clear answer for some
transactions, but for others it may not be clear where irrevocable liability was incurred. Furthermore, this test is easy to manipulate by agreeing that one or both parties will take steps to
create irrevocable liability outside the United States, for example, by making liability on the transaction contingent upon approval of the transaction by an agent located outside the United
States.
B. FROM GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION TOWARD CHOICE OF LAW
Jurisdictional competition in U.S. corporate law is based on
contracts rather than geography. To some extent this is also
true of European corporate law after the European Court of
Justice’s Inspire Art decision rejected some aspects of “seat the279
ory.” Incorporators—and persons who become shareholders,
directors, and officers in their corporations—opt into a particular jurisdiction’s corporate law. If shareholders, directors, and
officers perceive their initial choice as suboptimal later, they
can opt out of the original jurisdiction and opt into another jurisdiction’s corporate law by reincorporating somewhere else. It
does not matter where the corporation is located or where it
does business.
Securities law traditionally has rejected this approach.
Contractual opting-out is not permissible under the Securities
276. See Fox, supra note 12, at 85–89.
277. See Kaal & Painter, supra note 82, at 88–91.
278. Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Ficeto, 677 F.3d 60, 62
(2d Cir. 2012).
279. See Kirchner, Painter & Kaal, supra note 15, at 89.
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Act of 1933 or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Morrison,
however, may force a reconsideration of this position, at least
for those transactions that are easy to structure to take place
outside the United States so that U.S. securities laws will not
apply. If the parties contractually agree to have the transaction
take place somewhere else, such as in London, Morrison requires that U.S. courts respect this choice. This is true even if
most of the design and marketing of the transaction occurred
inside the United States; Section 10(b) does not apply in private
281
lawsuits if there is no actual U.S. transaction. By choosing
the location of the transaction, the parties have effectively chosen to opt out of U.S. securities law.
One alternative is to abandon Morrison’s transactional
test—as well as the hostility of U.S. securities laws to private
ordering—and substitute a pure choice of law regime in which
contracting parties specify the jurisdiction whose securities law
applies. Congress is unlikely to enact such a regime, however,
and the statutory restrictions on parties contractually opting
out of U.S. securities law will prevent U.S. courts from imposing a pure choice of law regime. On the other hand, courts will
also have to deal with the wide range of transactions that cannot definitively be identified as taking place inside or outside
the United States. For these transactions in which the transactional test cannot easily be applied anyway, the choice of law
rule might be the best solution.
A rule that allows the parties’ choice of law to control for
geographically ambiguous transactions could be harmonized
with both Morrison and the existing statutory framework. The
rule would stipulate that unless a transaction is unambiguously inside the United States, the transaction does not take place
inside the United States if the parties have expressly stated
their intent that it does not take place inside the United States.
When the parties express no intent, U.S. law could be deemed
to be the default rule if one of the parties is located inside the
United States. Conversely, non-U.S. law could be the default
rule if none of the parties are located inside the United States.
Alternatively, the default rule could depend upon the place
where the transaction clears. Other factors could be considered
280. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77n (2006); Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78cc (2006).
281. See the district court’s holding on 1934 Act claims in SEC v. Goldman
Sachs & Co., 790 F. Supp. 2d 147, 163–64 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), but not on all of the
1933 Act claims brought by the SEC.
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as well, although it is best that the rule be clear enough that
the relevant factors are known to the parties at the time of the
transaction. In sum, unless other indicators of geography provide a clear answer as to the location of the transaction, the
parties’ choice should determine the transaction location and,
hence, the law that will apply and most likely also the forum in
which litigation over the transaction will be heard.
A danger from a pure contract-based approach is the race
to the bottom phenomenon: if some contracting parties choose a
jurisdiction with regulations that offer inadequate protection to
other parties. Such a race to the bottom, however, requires at
least the consent of both parties (buyers as well as sellers); the
race to the bottom argument assumes that buyers will simply
accept whatever securities laws sellers choose. This may be
true for some exchange-traded securities, and this is a reason
for preventing choice of law to trump geography for transactions that unequivocally take place inside the United States. In
private transactions where geography is ambiguous, however,
buyers may be more sophisticated and also are put on notice
that foreign law may apply by the very factors that make geography ambiguous, for example, where there are non-U.S. parties to the transaction or if the transaction clears outside the
United States. In these instances, the race to the bottom argument may not be persuasive.
The race to the bottom concern is also addressed to some
extent if SEC and DOJ enforcement follow some securities
transactions outside the United States, as contemplated by
282
Section 929P(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act. While this approach
may have costs, particularly the risk that a transaction is subject to the law of more than one jurisdiction, it could mitigate
the threat of a race to the bottom.
Regulating buyers rather than transactions could also help
address the race to the bottom problem. Statutes or regulations
could restrain some buyers from engaging in securities transactions governed by the laws of jurisdictions that do not offer adequate protection to buyers. Indeed, the Dodd-Frank Act already regulates what types of securities certain financial
institutions may buy, and this trend toward regulating buyers’
decisions may continue. Regulating some buyers’ choice of law
could be a better approach than insisting that the parties have
no choice of law. Indeed, regulating buyers’ choices may be the
282. See supra Part II.
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only effective way of keeping their investments under U.S. securities law because, even if a pure geography based transaction test is retained, it is easy to manipulate. It is relatively effortless for sophisticated parties to move a transaction to a
different location if they want a different law to apply.
In sum, if certain transacting parties’ decisions about
choice of law seem suboptimal, whether because they are illinformed or for some other reason, it could be preferable to require these particular parties to choose U.S. securities law.
This approach could be preferable to pretending that there is
no choice of law for transactions deemed to be in the United
States, but then allowing parties to take evasive action to relocate transactions outside the United States.
One way to regulate buyers’ investment decisions is to use
the “suitability rule” requiring brokers to put customers into
283
“suitable” investments. This rule could be interpreted to provide that U.S. brokers must recommend to all but the most sophisticated individual clients brokerage transactions governed
by U.S. securities law or the law of other countries with similar
protections. Persons making investment decisions for retirement funds, foundations, non-profit endowments, and some
mutual funds could be similarly restricted, at least with respect
to a certain percentage of their investment portfolios. State and
local governments could pass laws providing that public funds
would only be invested in securities transactions governed by
U.S. law or the law of some countries but not others.
C. INTEGRATING CHOICE OF LAW INTO POST-MORRISON
SECURITIES LAW
There are several ways in which transacting parties’ choice
of law could become a factor in determining when U.S. securities law applies to a transaction. One approach would be for
courts interpreting Morrison to take the parties’ choice of law
284
into consideration in deciding the location of a transaction.
283. See Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Valuation—Retailization, Regulation,
and Investor Suitability, 28 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 581, 630–37 (2009)
(discussing the application of investor suitability principles in the context of
hedge fund investing).
284. If, as suggested in this article, the parties’ choice of law was considered a determining factor for identifying the location of a transaction, an additional complication arises if one of the parties seeks to use a choice of U.S. law
to sue a third party that did not make that choice—for example, an issuer of
the securities that is outside the United States and takes no steps to cause its
securities to be traded in the United States. For this reason, the parties’ choice
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Courts could clarify the post-Morrison environment by identifying certain categories of transactions where transaction location will be determined by the parties’ choice of law. This
“choice of law” category might include private transactions
where both parties have a presence outside the United States,
even if the parties also have a presence inside the United
States as do many large financial institutions. Choice of law
might also be allowed to determine transaction location where
only one party has a presence outside the United States but the
transaction also clears outside the United States—for example,
a U.S. buyer agrees to purchase securities privately from a
U.K. seller in a transaction that will settle in London.
A more debatable situation arises if only one party is present in the United States and the transaction clears in the
United States. Arguably, sophisticated parties in this situation
should be permitted to agree that the transaction will be governed by the securities laws of the jurisdiction of the non-U.S.
party. However, the statutory prohibition on contracting
285
around U.S. securities law suggests that the U.S. party who
transfers funds inside the United States to buy securities
should be protected by U.S. law. Another debatable situation
arises if both parties only have a U.S. presence but the transaction clears outside the United States. Should two U.S. parties
with no U.K. presence be permitted to agree that only U.K. law
will apply to their private transaction that clears in London?
An important factor in determining transaction location in
all of these situations should be whether the foreign jurisdicof law is most helpful for identifying the location of a transaction in a dispute
between the transacting parties, or where the SEC or DOJ claims that one of
the parties defrauded the other. Choice of law is a less helpful factor in situations where the alleged violator had no role in the choice of law. For example,
in the Porsche case, discussed supra notes 13 & 80, even if the swap parties
had agreed that their swap referencing VW stock would be governed by U.S.
law, this should not give them a right to allege a claim under U.S. law against
VW, a company whose stock is traded in Germany and not in the United
States, or a claim against Porsche for its trades in VW stock in Germany.
285. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 78cc (providing in Section 29(a) that
“[a]ny condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person to waive compliance with any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder,
or of any rule of an exchange required thereby shall be void.” Section 29(b)
provides that “[e]very contract made in violation of any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder, and every contract (including any
contract for listing a security on an exchange) heretofore or hereafter made,
the performance of which involves the violation of, or the continuance of any
relationship or practice in violation of, any provision of this chapter or any
rule or regulation thereunder, shall be void . . . .”).
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tion chosen by the parties actually will accept jurisdiction over
the transaction and apply its law. If the parties contract for
U.K. securities law, one risk is that U.K. courts will decline to
apply U.K. law because the transaction did not clear in the
U.K, or because one or both parties do not have a U.K. presence, or for some other reason. If so, the contract to apply nonU.S. law might as a practical matter mean that no law applies.
One of the parties—perhaps the party more likely to commit
securities fraud—might be more aware of this risk than the
other party. A contract allowing a securities transaction to end
up in a lawless no-man’s-land probably should not be permitted.
The complexities in the above discussion suggest, however,
that U.S. courts have a limited capacity to integrate choice of
law into a post-Morrison regime defining transaction location.
There are enough variables in the equation already that courts
may be reluctant to vary their analysis of transaction location
because of the parties’ choice of law. The risk of inconsistent
case law in different districts and in different circuits also increases with the number of variables that courts consider. This
could be an additional disincentive for courts to embark upon a
choice of law regime rather than try to make their geographic
definition of transaction location as consistent as possible with
that of other courts. Thus, without any clear mandate in Morrison to consider contractual choice of law in determining transaction location, and with a statutory prohibition on “opting
286
out,” lower federal courts may prefer to struggle with the
ambiguities of geography rather than consider choice of law.
This is where the SEC could step in to implement a choice
of law regime through rulemaking. Under the Chevron doc287
trine, federal courts give considerable deference to federal
agencies in interpreting the statutes Congress has charged
them with implementing. If the SEC promulgates a rule defining transaction location for purposes of the holding in Morrison,
the federal courts will probably defer to the rule. Indeed, courts
may welcome such a rule if it helps them avoid struggling to
define transaction location on their own. The SEC rule could
take the parties’ choice of law into account in those situations
where transaction location is otherwise ambiguous.

286. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 78cc.
287. See Chevron U.S.A, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837,
866 (1984).
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The SEC could also address the problem of dual-listed exchange-traded securities which arose in the Vivendi securities
litigation, although it appears that in this area the district
courts are defining a relatively clear rule, namely that Section
10(b) does not apply to dual-listed securities when the transac288
tion takes place on a non-U.S. exchange. The problem may
become more difficult to resolve for exchanges that establish a
presence both in the United States and in a non-U.S. jurisdiction. In those instances, an SEC rule could provide that the exchange can establish rules designating in which of the two jurisdictions a particular transaction takes place.
Another area of complexity is security-based swaps. These
include transactions that involve U.S.-swap parties and reference a security only traded outside the United States as in the
289
Porsche case, as well as those that involve only non-U.S. parties but reference a security that is traded inside the United
States, for example, a German swap referencing common stock
in General Motors. The SEC should probably promulgate rules
identifying the location of the transaction for purposes of Section 10(b) and perhaps also other relevant provisions of U.S. se290
curities laws.
Redirecting the focal point of securities regulation from the
geographic location of securities transactions toward the choice
of law by buyers and sellers of securities will be controversial,
but in some transactions where geography is ambiguous it may
be inevitable. Focusing on the choice of law could be more effective than trying to impose a single body of law on securities
transactions within a single geographic area when many securities transactions at least arguably take place in more than
one geographic area. Geographic constraints are also rather
limited in a globalized world where parties can readily change
transaction locations as they please. If parties’ efforts to manipulate geography are successful, parties will be able to evade
the statutory prohibition on opting out of U.S. securities law
anyway. Clear guidelines for contractually defining the location
of a securities transaction could be the best alternative.
288. See In re Vivendi Universal Sec. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 512, 525–34
(S.D.N.Y. 2011).
289. See Elliott Assoc. v. Porsche Auto. Holding SE, 759 F. Supp. 2d 469,
476 (S.D.N.Y 2010); Brief of Richard W. Painter et al. as Amici Curiae Law
Professors Supporting Respondents, Viking Global v. Porsche Auto. No. 11-397
(2d. Cir. Aug. 3, 2011), 2012 WL 453966, at *3.
290. See Painter, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, supra note 11, at 228 (discussing various proposals for SEC rulemaking in this area).
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Much of the above discussion has focused on parties opting
out of U.S. securities law and choosing the law of another jurisdiction. For two reasons, however, some parties might prefer
U.S. law. First, to the extent U.S. law provides more effective
remedies for securities fraud and better deterrence, parties to
securities transactions may prefer it and even insist upon it.
(As already pointed out above, some buyers should perhaps be
required to engage only in transactions governed by U.S. securities law.) Second, if exposure to litigation in Dutch courts, or
in some other non-U.S. jurisdiction, is undesirable, parties may
want to make sure their transactions are covered by U.S. law.
Although application of U.S. law is no guarantee that the
Netherlands or some other jurisdiction will not engage in Forum Competition and allow simultaneous litigation over the
same transactions, taking steps to locate a transaction inside
the United States for purposes of Morrison might convince nonU.S. courts to stand down and let U.S. courts adjudicate a dispute.
In sum, choice of law should replace the geographicallybased transactional test in those circumstances where geography is ambiguous. Regardless of whether geography or choice of
law controls, parties should be able to know in advance whether U.S. securities laws apply, and not have this decision be
made by courts unpredictably after the fact. Choice of Law
Competition between the United States and other jurisdictions
would recognize that different jurisdictions have different substantive and procedural law and would allow the parties to determine for themselves ex ante which securities laws govern
their transactions.
IV. COORDINATION OF JURISDICTIONAL COMPETITION
IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE
In Morrison, the United States took an important unilateral step away from overreaching in Forum Competition. Before Morrison, there was a significant risk that U.S. law would
be applied to securities transactions taking place outside the
United States because the conduct and effects tests suggested a
U.S. connection with the alleged fraud. Now the transaction itself must have a connection with the United States that is sufficiently strong that a U.S. court will deem the transaction to
have taken place inside the United States. There is still the potential for U.S. overreaching in some private transactions and
in unorthodox transactions, such as security-based swaps ref-
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erencing foreign-traded securities, but so far the lower federal
courts have exercised considerable restraint. Plaintiffs’ lawyers
and perhaps some transacting parties may seek application of
U.S. law to transactions that take place beyond our borders,
but U.S. courts will likely not participate in extensive Forum
Competition absent a statutory mandate that they do so.
The notable exception to this restraint is Section 929P of
the Dodd-Frank Act. Section 929P may apply to securities
transactions taking place outside the United States. There is a
risk that SEC and DOJ actions under Section 929P and the
laws and enforcement policies of non-U.S. jurisdictions may collide. When Section 929P is used, transacting parties are at risk
of being subjected to the securities laws of two or more jurisdictions whose rules may be inconsistent.
The developments in the Netherlands thus far do not pose
too big a risk that parties to securities transactions inside the
United States will be subjected to litigation in Dutch courts as
well as in U.S. courts. However, given the massive expansion of
Dutch jurisdiction in the cases under the WCAM and the trend
towards a continuing expansion, future developments could
make it possible that “purely” American cases that pass the
transactional test under Morrison could also be litigated in the
Netherlands.
Dutch courts have already enforced international collective
settlements where none of the defendants and only a few plaintiffs were domiciled in the Netherlands, the alleged wrongdoing
took place outside the Netherlands, and the claims were not
291
brought under Dutch law. There is some evidence that Dutch
courts may uphold jurisdiction in the Netherlands, even with292
out a single interested person domiciled in the Netherlands.
There is also evidence that Dutch courts are acting with full
knowledge of the significance and the implications of their
judgments, in effect creating an alternative European venue for
293
international collective settlements in mass claims. Given the
Dutch Supreme Court’s presumption of reliance/causation in

291. See Converium COA Decision, supra note 32, ¶ 3.
292. See Legal Alert Converium, supra note 34, at 2.
293. Id. at 3 (“It should be noted that the Court is fully aware of the significance of its judgment in creating an alternative venue to declare international
collective settlements in mass claims binding on all class members. The Court
explicitly referred to the limitations for the U.S. courts to do so in securities
and anti-trust cases as a result of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in Morrison v. National Australia Bank and Hoffman-La Roche v. Empagran.”).
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294

prospectus liability cases,
and its expansion beyond the
295
fraud-on-the-market theory, it seems possible, if not likely,
that Dutch courts will continue to expand their theories to oth296
er areas. In light of these trends, it seems possible that even
American cases that were not dismissed under Morrison could
in the future be litigated in Dutch courts.
We are not speculating herein as to what the possible consequences of such developments could be. Depending on future
developments in this context, however, the acceptable outer
bounds of jurisdictional competition by both Europe and the
United States might eventually be defined by treaty or other
multilateral agreement. If the trend toward a substantial expansion of the Netherlands jurisdiction continues and
increasses, the Netherlands, and perhaps, the other E.U. member states, could agree that civil litigation in Dutch courts, or
the courts of another E.U. member state, will not include securities transactions that take place inside the United States and
that are subject to U.S. law. Alternatively, countries could
agree that litigation over extraterritorial securities transactions would not go forward if the country where the transactions took place formally objects to the proceeding and provides
assurance that its own securities laws will be applied to the
transaction in either a government enforcement proceeding or a
private lawsuit. If there were to be such a treaty or other
agreement, the United States could agree to restrain the exercise of the powers that the SEC and DOJ purportedly have under Section 929P so that U.S. enforcement actions do not disrupt non-U.S. markets or the enforcement agenda of non-U.S.
regulators.
Short of treaties or other bilateral and multilateral agreements, U.S. executive branch agencies and courts, as well as
their foreign counterparts, could take steps to curtail Forum
Competition that undermines relations with other countries.
The United States already did so when the Supreme Court de294. See HR 27 november 2009, JOR 2010, 43 m.nt. K. Frielink (VEB
e.a./World Online e.a.) (Neth.), available at http://zoeken.rechtspraak.nl/
detailpage.aspx?ljn=BH2162; de Jong, supra note 25, at 364 –65 (discussing
the World Online decision and its implications); Thompson, supra note 25, at
1129–44 (explaining the differences of the Dutch and U.S. system of securities
litigation and underscoring the attractiveness of the Dutch rules).
295. See supra Part II.B.3.
296. See supra Part II.B.3. Expansion of Dutch courts’ theories could include liability for misrepresentation in periodic disclosure and other types of
securities fraud.

204

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[97:132

cided Morrison and Congress in 2010 declined to reinstate private lawsuits under the conduct and effects tests. The possibility that the SEC and DOJ will aggressively use Section 929P
remains, however, and the SEC should consult with foreign
regulators and perhaps with the U.S. Department of State before this provision is used to conduct enforcement actions or investigations concerning non-U.S. securities transactions. If Section 929P causes problems with foreign regulators in the
future, Congress should amend the statute to require such consultation or even provide the State Department with the power
to terminate a Section 929P proceeding upon a finding that it
interferes unacceptably with foreign relations. Countries such
as the Netherlands that may entertain private lawsuits over
securities transactions outside their borders should seriously
consider judicial doctrines based on comity to dismiss or modify
suits that create a conflict with the laws of other countries. In
this regard, the pre-Morrison observations of Professor Hannah
Buxbaum on comity could be very helpful; she suggested in
2007 that courts applying the conduct and effects tests should
exercise discretionary dismissal of suits and apply foreign law
instead of U.S. law in cases where doing otherwise creates a se297
rious conflict with foreign laws. Although the conduct and effects tests are now defunct in private litigation in the United
States after Morrison, Professor Hannah Buxbaum’s suggestion
and similar suggestions should inform the jurisprudence of
other jurisdictions that allow private suits over extraterritorial
transactions. These jurisdictions also might consider a “right to
sue” procedure in which a domestic securities regulator and the
jurisdiction’s foreign office must give prior approval for a suit
over extraterritorial securities transactions to go forward.
CONCLUSION
While many jurisdictions could be worse than the United
States at protecting investors, it is not at all certain that U.S.
law does a better job of deterring securities fraud. While private rights of action (particularly class actions under the fraudon-the-market theory) and the SEC enforcement regime in the
United States are at times vigorous, securities fraud is a persistent problem in the United States. U.S. investment bankers,
who are supposed to function as gatekeepers, may have worse
incentives than in some other countries and some cultural
297. Buxbaum, supra note 224, at 64 –67.

2012]

COMPETITION IN SECURITIES LAW

205
298

norms in the United States may encourage securities fraud.
The U.S. system of civil litigation (class actions under the
fraud-on-the-market theory) and regulation (including the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010) is
expensive. Compliance and litigation costs are likely passed on
to investors. It is not certain that the payoff in less fraud is
worthwhile. At the very least, there is a good case for allowing
jurisdictional competition to continue with both the United
States and other countries using coordination to define both the
outer limits of choice of law by transacting parties and the outer limits of jurisdictional overreach by their regulators and
courts.

298. See Claire Hill & Richard W. Painter, Berle’s Vision Beyond Shareholder Interests: Why Investment Bankers Should Have (Some) Personal Liability, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1173, 1177–78 (2010) (arguing that investment
banks switching from partnerships to corporate forms left bankers with no
personal liability for failures leading to excessive risk taking).

